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insufficiently “neutral” towards users or third parties that interact with the 
platform.  For example, Google faces a formal FTC investigation based on 
allegations that it has tinkered with search results rather than presenting users with 
a “neutral” result.  Twitter faces a formal investigation after the social media 
service restricted the ways in which third party developers could interact with 
Twitter through its application programming interface (“API”).  These 
investigations represent a new attempt to shift the network neutrality debate to 
higher-level Internet platforms.  Rather than focusing on providing basic Internet 
access neutrally, these novel neutrality claims look to platforms that are built upon 
the Internet, and seek to ensure that they, too, behave “neutrally.”  Unfortunately, 
network neutrality principles do not transition well from Internet service providers 
to search engines and social media sites.  Ultimately, the network neutrality debate 
serves as a poor tool for scrutiny of higher-level Internet platforms.  This Article 
demonstrates that network neutrality cannot be applied to higher-level Internet 
platforms and then examines another possible method of analyzing novel neutrality 
claims using antitrust law.  It re-frames novel neutrality claims as tying 
arrangements, the subject of extensive antitrust law and scholarship.  In applying 
tying doctrine to novel neutrality claims, this Article demonstrates that it, too, is 
insufficient for examining novel neutrality claims on Internet platforms.  The Article 
closes by proposing a different analysis to examine these novel neutrality claims, an 
analysis based on Justice O’Connor’s attempt to reform tying doctrine. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In today’s Internet, the most important players are not manufacturers, designers, 
or programmers, but platforms.  The big names in the Internet and computing—
Google, Apple, Facebook, Microsoft—all offer more than a product or set of 
products.  They offer an environment in which users operate, a starting point for 
them to interact, work, network, and be entertained.1  These platforms build upon the 
infrastructure of the Internet.  For example, Google began as a search engine but 
now offers a group of websites, each of which links prominently to the others and 
provides a different service to users including maps, e-mail, a social networking 
service, a photo-sharing service, and dozens of others.  It also offers a mobile 
environment through its Android operating system.  Even Facebook is not simply a 
social-networking website but a platform upon which users can play games, share 
photos, and engage in a number of other social activities.  Countless other websites 
and services allow users to post their activity to Facebook (or tweet it on Twitter).  
For example, a user of the social check-in service Foursquare has the option of 
                                                          
 
1
 See Hanno F. Kaiser, Are “Closed Systems” an Antitrust Problem, 7 COMP. POL’Y INT’L 
91, 99-101 (2011).  According to Nokia CEO Stephen Elop: 
The battle of devices has now become a war of ecosystems, where ecosystems include 
not only the hardware and software of the device, but developers, applications, 
ecommerce, advertising, search, social applications, location-based services, unified 
communications and many other things. Our competitors aren’t taking our market 
share with devices; they are taking our market share with an entire ecosystem. This 
means we’re going to have to decide how we either build, catalyze or join an 
ecosystem. 
 
Id. (quoting Elop in an e-mail). 
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posting a check-in to their Facebook wall.  Similarly, a user of DailyFeats, a social 
media site for cataloguing daily accomplishments, has the option of posting their 
feats to Facebook.2  These platforms interact with each other and at times blur the 
lines between them.3 
The next chapter in the story of competition and innovation on the Internet will 
rely on these platforms.  Many Internet platforms have recently faced criticism, legal 
complaints, and formal investigations for being insufficiently “neutral.”  The 
network neutrality debate has expanded.  Neutrality advocates are no longer focused 
simply on physical gatekeepers to the Internet, but want to ensure that platforms that 
are built upon the Internet infrastructure themselves behave neutrally.  This has 
resulted in a number of novel neutralities, some of which have become widely 
known.  This article focuses on three such neutralities: search neutrality; API 
neutrality; and online marketplace neutrality.  Generally, these novel neutrality 
claims seek to require platforms to treat all users and platform applications the same, 
without blocking or tolling some subset of disfavored applications, users, or uses. 
This policy debate and the manner in which Internet platforms’ relationships with 
each other and their users are scrutinized by the FTC and other enforcement agencies 
may radically influence how Internet platforms grow, innovate, and compete—in 
positive or negative ways.  This Article considers two methods that the FTC or other 
enforcers may use to scrutinize violations of neutrality principles by Internet 
platforms, one based on network neutrality rules, and the other based on antitrust 
law.  The Article demonstrates that neither of these methods is reasonable for 
analyzing the behavior of Internet platforms, and instead proposes a different 
method, loosely based on Justice O’Connor’s proposed reforms to tying doctrine.4 
A vital area in which public policy may constrain Internet platforms is in how 
they interact with other platforms, services, and applications.  Some platforms may 
choose to be very open and neutral towards applications built upon and services 
using the platform, others may wish to stop third-party uses of the platform, or limit 
interactions with the platform.  Based on these different platform policies, Internet-
based platforms face claims that they must behave neutrally towards applications or 
platform users.  Importantly, these neutrality claims are not limited to scholars and 
commentators—instead, major Internet platforms including Google, Twitter, and 
Apple have faced recent investigations or threats of investigation by the FTC or 
another antitrust or telecommunications enforcement agencies.  These investigations, 
spanning several forms of neutrality, raise the possibility of widespread scrutiny of 
Internet platforms that could radically influence the development of the Internet 
landscape.  This paper considers the methods by which scrutiny of Internet platforms 
should proceed in order to identify harmful arrangements without penalizing 
competitive behavior. 
                                                          
 
2
 DAILY FEATS, www.dailyfeats.com (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
 
3
 Users of the program Tweet deck, for example, might see and respond to items from 
several social media sites without distinguishing one from another.  See Jaymar Cabebe, 
HootSuite, TweetDeck, or Seesmic?, THE DOWNLOAD BLOG (Aug. 5, 2011, 4:43 PM), 
http://download.cnet.com/8301-2007_4-20088869-12/hootsuite-tweetdeck-or-seesmic/ (“For 
Android users, there are basically three apps to choose from when it comes to one-stop social 
networking: HootSuite, TweetDeck, and Seesmic.”). 
 
4
 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 32 (1984) (O’Connor, J. 
concurring). 
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For the most part, when platforms run afoul of neutrality principles, it is because 
they have discriminated between platform applications in a way that limits the ways 
in which the platform can be used.  Oftentimes, a platform will want to give access 
to some applications but not others, or give some applications access on more 
favorable terms.  For example, iTunes screens apps before granting them access to 
the exclusive marketplace for iOS devices and iTunes, and imposes terms on 
products that filter some products out of the iTunes market.  This discrimination 
between applications, giving access to some but not others, has raised an alarm in 
some quarters.5  Some commentators have advocated expansion of network 
neutrality principles to these higher-level Internet platforms6—a platform that is not 
open equally to all is a violation of neutrality principles that some argue must be 
legally addressed.7  Others have proposed scrutinizing discriminatory platform 
actions under the antitrust laws.   
We know a great deal about how platforms behave.  Economists have examined 
situations in which it is efficient and pro-competitive for platforms to allow open 
access or to discriminate between potential platform applications, and when platform 
owners are likely to make an anticompetitive choice to open or close platforms.  
Unfortunately, the two frameworks that are likely candidates for analysis of novel 
neutrality claims aimed at Internet platforms are out of touch with developed 
economic principles.  If applied to these Internet-based platforms, network neutrality 
rules will achieve nonsensical and harmful results, and antitrust scrutiny of 
discriminatory platform actions as tying arrangements would impose a quasi-per se 
rule forcing platforms open without adequate evidence that a closed platform is 
harmful. 
This Article applies these two methodologies to three examples of Internet 
platforms that discriminate in some way against platform applications: search 
neutrality; API neutrality; and online marketplace neutrality.  I propose amendments 
to these frameworks to bring them into line with current economic understanding of 
platform behavior.  Specifically, I propose the adoption of a rule similar to Justice 
O’Connor’s proposed alterations to the Court’s tying doctrine, beginning with an 
analysis that considers the market position of the platform and considers the likely 
effects of discriminatory action towards platform applications.  Part II examines our 
current knowledge of the economics of platforms.  Parts III and IV examine network 
neutrality and antitrust frameworks and the attempts to apply these frameworks to 
fears that Internet platforms are insufficiently neutral in their interactions with 
platform applications.  Part V applies each framework to three Internet platforms that 
have faced novel neutrality claims, demonstrating that neither the network neutrality 
nor the antitrust framework are suitable methods for scrutinizing the ways in which 
Internet-based platforms may discriminate against applications.  Part VI concludes 
by proposing a reasonable way to engage in scrutiny of novel neutrality claims. 
                                                          
 
5
 See infra Section V.d, considering neutrality claims directed at online marketplaces. 
 
6
 I refer the Internet platforms discussed here as “higher-level” Internet platforms because 
they are not directly tied to any single physical connection that allows individuals to connect 
to the Internet, rather, they are built upon the diffuse platform that is the Internet. 
 
7
 See infra Section V, examining efforts to apply neutrality principles to three Internet 
platforms. 
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II.  ECONOMICS OF PLATFORMS 
Over the past several decades, there has been a great deal of scholarship on the 
economics of platform behavior.  Though there are ongoing debates about how 
platforms, especially Internet platforms function, there are areas of general 
consensus.  This section identifies a small number of generally accepted principles 
regarding how platforms behave and when they may have negative effects on 
competition.  The following Sections demonstrate that the likely methods for 
analyzing novel neutrality claims on Internet platforms are not in line with the 
economic realities of platform behavior.   
The first generally accepted principle is that neither an open platform nor a 
closed one is inherently more efficient or better for competition than the other.  
Some level of discrimination may be optimal for competition, the competitors, and 
consumers.  Whether it is better for the platform owner to open or close their 
platform, or whether either option can harm the competitive process is specific to the 
situation.   
Platform owners may face legitimate incentives to select an open or closed 
platform policy.8  Neutrality claims generally seek to require platforms to be more 
open and not to discriminate between potential platform applications.  But some 
closed platforms achieve desirable results through discrimination.  At times, careful 
discrimination in allowing access to the platform may be necessary to successful 
market competition.  Professors Joseph Farrell and Philip Weiser identify a number 
of well-known situations where platforms achieve desirable results by remaining 
closed.  For example, an innovative and rapidly evolving platform may wish to have 
greater control over platform applications in order to ensure that applications keep 
pace with the innovative platform as it competes with other platforms.9  Similarly if 
a platform exerts control over a small number of available applications, rather than 
allowing a large competitive applications market to flourish, consumers may be 
assured that applications will work well with the platform, and may face smaller 
search costs in selecting applications.10  Similarly, distinguishing between high and 
low quality applications may be a particular problem for consumers in a totally open 
platform—a problem that may cause consumers to lose confidence in the platform 
after exposure to a few low-quality applications.  Lack of control over platform 
applications was the downfall of the Atari gaming system which faced a deluge of 
low-quality games from many game designers—the game market was diluted and 
consumers became disenchanted with the platform after experiences with low-
quality games.  This encouraged competition from other, more tightly controlled 
systems, like the Nintendo, with its own set of games available only on the 
Nintendo, which Atari could not offer on its system.11  As a result, later gaming 
                                                          
 
8
 See Joseph Farrell & Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open 
Access Policies: Towards a Convergence of Antitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 
HARV. J. L. & TECH. 85, 97 (2003). 
 
9
 See id. at 99. 
 
10
 Id.; see also Kaiser, supra note 1, at 99-101.  This is the route taken by Apple, which 
imposes specific requirements on apps’ access to the platform.  See App Store Review 
Guidelines, APPLE, http://developer.apple.com/appstore/guidelines.html (last visited Aug. 24, 
2011). 
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systems have maintained different levels of tighter control over their applications 
markets.12  Following this model, Apple screens the apps that are available on 
iPhones and iPads, barring, among others, apps that add little or nothing to the user 
experience.13  One justification for this limitation could be to make it easier for users 
to find quality apps—and this is consistent with Apple’s general (and oft-criticized) 
“walled garden” philosophy, where it offers a more curated group of applications.14   
There are good reasons for some platforms to limit application access.  But on 
the other hand, by allowing vigorous competition in an applications market, an open 
platform can ensure that a wide range of applications will be available to consumers 
as cheaply as possible.15  According to Farrell and Weiser, platform owners can 
generally be relied upon to select a degree of openness that will allow the platform to 
provide the most value to consumers.  They call this concept “internalizing 
complementary efficiencies,” or ICE:  
“[I]n choosing how to license interface information, certify 
complementors, and otherwise deal with developers, . . . a firm has a clear 
incentive to choose the pattern that will best provide it or its customers 
with applications. . . . [T]he unintegrated platform monopolist has an 
                                                          
 
11
 See Philip J. Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 
COLUM. L. REV. 534, 607 (2003) (“By not affording Atari an intellectual property right to play 
Nintendo games on its console, the court encouraged rivals to build up their own systems, 
which Sega, Sony, and Microsoft later did successfully.”). 
 
12
 A current example of platforms facing a similar problem can be found in competition 
between mobile operating systems.  Google’s Android allows any designer to create apps that 
function on the operating system.  See ANDROID MARKET, http://market.android.com (last 
visited Nov. 15, 2011).  Apple requires apps to be approved before they are available to 
consumers in the App Store.  See App Store Review Guidelines, APPLE, 
http://developer.apple.com/appstore/guidelines.html (last visited Nov. 15, 2011) (“The app 
approval process is in place to ensure that applications are reliable, perform as expected, and 
are free of explicit and offensive material. We review every app on the App Store based on a 
set of technical, content, and design criteria.”).  While Apple faces criticism that it is 
insufficiently open to allow for innovative apps, it has hedged against the risk that consumers 
will lose confidence in the platform due to low-quality or harmful apps.  In fact, Android, but 
not iOS, has been occasionally plagued by malicious apps that do harm consumers or their 
devices.  See Android Market a Breeding Ground for Malicious Mobile Apps, SECURITY WEEK 
(Aug. 12, 2010), https://www.securityweek.com/android-market-breeding-ground-malicious-
mobile-apps. 
 
13
 See Apple removes $1,000 featureless iPhone application, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2008 
(stating Apple removed an app called ‘I Am Rich’ that cost the maximum allowed price of 
$999.99 and did almost nothing). 
 
14
 Notably, though Apple is heavily criticized for its controlled approach, more apps are 
available for iOS than for Android, though there are more free apps on Android.  See Shocker! 
Free Android apps outnumber free iPhone apps, ENGAGET (Apr. 28, 2011, 10:04 PM), 
http://www.engadget.com/2011/04/28/shocker-free-android-apps-outnumber-free-iphone-
apps/. 
 
15
 See Kaiser, supra note 1, at 101. 
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incentive to favor whichever form of organization of applications is most 
efficient (or delivers the most value to users).”16   
There are well-known exceptions to ICE—if we could simply rely on a platform to 
always make the most efficient decision as to whether to open their platform to 
outside developers or not, there would be no need for neutrality principles or 
antitrust scrutiny to push for either an open framework or a closed one.  The most 
notable of these well-known exceptions where a platform owner may not select the 
value-maximizing option are: when the platform price is regulated; when the 
platform owner fears platform competition from application developers; when the 
platform owner fears losing the option of returning to a closed platform; and when 
complementarity is incomplete between the platform and the applications, the 
platform owner may keep the platform closed in order to occupy a greater portion of 
the applications market.17 
A second area of general consensus is that market power is a necessary condition 
for competitive harm to stem from a platform’s decision to close, to remain closed, 
or to discriminate between platform applications.  Antitrust law has incorporated this 
general agreement into its standards.18  The reasons behind it are clear.  Without 
market power, a platform owner that has a closed or discriminatory policy towards 
platform applications will simply drive blocked applications to competing platforms.  
To the extent that these applications benefit consumers, the competing platforms will 
gain an advantage.  Though limits on applications may force applications out of the 
market or raise barriers to their entry, a single platform in a competitive platform 
market cannot alone cause such effects.19 
Though market power is necessary for a platform to cause competitive harm in 
an applications market, it is generally recognized that a platform with market power 
deciding to move towards a more closed platform model or discriminating against 
some applications is not necessarily anticompetitive.  As discussed above, there are 
many efficient, pro-competitive reasons for a platform to close or restrict the market 
for platform applications—for example to maintain a rapid pace of innovation for an 
innovating platform, to maintain quality control or security among applications, or to 
lower consumer search costs.  In some situations, a platform, even one with market 
power, may be less attractive to consumers if it is open and non-discriminatory.   
Though market power is not sufficient to demonstrate an anticompetitive effect, 
such an effect is possible when a platform with market power chooses to close or to 
discriminate against applications.20  Generally, these anticompetitive effects will take 
                                                          
 
16
 Farrell & Weiser, supra note 8, at 101-02 (“That is, a firm will internalize 
complementary efficiencies arising from applications created by others.”). 
 
17
 See id. at 105-19. 
 
18
 See Kaiser, supra note 1, at 104 (“Without significant market power and the threat of a 
high level of market foreclosure, there is no basis for imposing antitrust liability on a platform 
sponsor’s ‘intra-platform legislation.’”). 
 
19
 See Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly 
Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 401 (2009) (emphasizing the appropriateness of a 
market power requirement in analyzing tying arrangements). 
 
20
 See generally id. at 400.  Professor Elhauge identifies five harms that may stem from 
tying arrangements, most relevant here is that “tying can impair tied rival competitiveness in 
ways that increase tied product prices and profits.”  Id. 
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two forms—foreclosing existing market competitors from a market that is then 
overall less competitive; and excluding would-be competitors from a market, 
keeping that market at some lower level of competition. 
The basic model demonstrating that a monopolist has no incentive to tie in an 
inefficient way (Farrell and Weiser’s “obvious ICE”21) only holds when the two 
goods are generally consumed together.  But if, for example, there is a second 
market in which the platform application is useful, the platform with market power 
may favor one set of applications for its platform, in order to give the favored 
applications an edge in this other market.  Specifically, a disfavored application 
could be foreclosed from this market or excluded from attempting to enter it by 
virtue of its exclusion from the platform with market power.  For example, if some 
of the same video game titles are available for mobile device platforms (for example 
Android, iOS, and Blackberry) and home gaming systems (for example Wii, 
Playstation, and Xbox), one mobile platform with market power might exclude a set 
of games from its platform in order to allow favored games to benefit in the related 
home gaming market.22  The harm that occurs here is the foreclosure of existing 
firms not simply from the platform, but from the gaming market.  They could, for 
example, lose the opportunity to gain positive feedback and buzz between the mobile 
and home gaming markets—in some instances availability on multiple platforms 
might be important for marketing, or for added functionality.  In this situation, the 
platform’s exclusivity could also have exclusionary effects on potential video game 
designers, if joining the discriminatory platform is vital to enter the video game 
market, then platform exclusivity or discrimination will raise barriers to entering the 
applications (video game) market generally. 
Though some platform discrimination may cause exclusion and foreclosure in 
other markets, it may also have the pro-competitive effects described above, 
allowing the platform to better compete and be more efficient.  Anticompetitive 
effects must be considered against the pro-competitive effects of a more controlled 
platform that increase the overall value of the platform to consumers and increase 
consumption of the final product.  Competitive gains or the necessity of 
discrimination to successful competition may offset the limitations that the platform 
could cause in applications markets.  In some cases, the platform’s core business 
may not be possible without some application discrimination.23 
In summary: neither an open nor a closed platform is necessarily more efficient 
and both can be positive forms of competition; market power is necessary for a 
discriminatory platform to cause competitive harm, but it is not sufficient to 
demonstrate such harm; and the harms to competition that are likely to be caused by 
platforms non-neutral behavior are foreclosure and exclusion from related markets 
that are then less competitive.  Though much of antitrust law is generally in line with 
these areas of economic agreement,24 the two most often promoted methods for 
                                                          
 
21
 Id. at 101. 
 
22
 See Michael D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 
(1990); see also Elhauge, supra note 19, at 401. 
 
23
 This could be true of Internet search, where the very product offered is a list of relevant 
results to a search term.  Discrimination based on usefulness is what users want and expect of 
a search engine. 
 
24
 See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 8, at 128 (“Substantively, the Justice Department’s 
case against Microsoft relied on the potential competition exception to ICE.  The DOJ 
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analyzing novel neutrality claims of Internet-based platforms are far out of touch 
with them.  Network neutrality principles, especially those enshrined in the FCC’s 
Network Neutrality Order, either prohibit too much pro-competitive conduct or are 
simply nonsensical when applied to higher-level Internet platforms.  Antitrust’s 
tying doctrine comes closer to an appropriate standard, yet is imperfect because it 
imposes per se illegality on a number of platform activities that have strong pro-
competitive effects.  Parts III and IV examine each of these frameworks before Part 
V applies them to a set of Internet platforms facing neutrality claims to demonstrate 
the deficiencies of each of these frameworks. 
III.  BACKGROUND: THE NETWORK NEUTRALITY DEBATE AND ATTEMPTS TO APPLY 
NETWORK NEUTRALITY TO INTERNET-BASED PLATFORMS 
Network neutrality is a simple idea: that Internet gatekeepers should not 
discriminate between Internet users or applications based on their intended use of the 
network.  Instead, advocates argue, the Internet should be neutral as to the use to 
which it is put.  An extensive debate has defined the bounds of this simple principle, 
and has considered whether it should be enforceable by some body of law.  Recently, 
that debate has expanded in scope. 
The Internet is a communications platform, but it is also a platform upon which 
platforms are built.  Network neutrality debates to date have focused on the lowest 
level of the Internet infrastructure—access to the Internet itself, not the platforms 
built upon it.  Identified violations of the net-neutrality principle have tended to 
block, slow, or toll specific uses of the Internet.  The legal rules that have developed 
to analyze these simple violations may be applied in a relatively straightforward 
way.  Recently, however, the terms and principles of the network neutrality debate 
have been applied not just to access to the Internet, but also to higher-level platforms 
built upon it.  Application of these principles, described below, to higher-level 
Internet platforms creates problems and questions that are difficult to answer within 
the network neutrality debate.  Without careful consideration of how network 
neutrality problems should apply to higher-level Internet platforms, policy results 
will be nonsensical and potentially harmful. 
A.  Rules and Cases Establishing and Testing the Bounds of Network Neutrality 
Network neutrality law has rapidly evolved over the past several years—though 
there is no consensus that this evolution has resulted in a better regulatory 
environment.  Since December of 2010, both traditional fixed and mobile broadband 
Internet providers have been governed by the Federal Communications Commission 
under its Report and Order “Preserving the Open Internet.”25  The FCC Order sets 
out three general principles that it will enforce: 1) transparency; 2) no blocking; and 
3) no unreasonable discrimination.26  Transparency requires broadband providers to 
                                                          
developed evidence that Microsoft itself and others in the industry viewed the development of 
strong independent ‘middleware’ as a threat to Microsoft’s monopoly in operating systems.”). 
 
25
 Preserving the Open Internet, 25 F.C.C.R. 17905 (Dec. 21, 2010).  These network 
neutrality rules have recently faced an unsuccessful legislative challenge.  See Cecilia Kang, 
Senate Votes Against Net Neutrality Killer, Post Tech (Nov. 10, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-tech/post/senate-votes-against-net-neutrality-
killer/2011/11/10/gIQAdScC9M_blog.html. 
 
26
 Id. at ¶ 1. 
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disclose “network management practices, performance characteristics, and terms and 
conditions . . . .”27  The “no blocking” principle prohibits fixed broadband providers 
from blocking “lawful content, applications, services, or non-harmful devices.”28  
“No blocking” is applied less stringently to mobile broadband providers who may 
block applications, services, or devices, but may not block “lawful websites, or . . . 
applications that compete with their voice or video telephony services.”29  The “no 
unreasonable discrimination” principle applies equally to fixed and mobile 
broadband providers and prohibits discrimination in “transmitting lawful network 
traffic.”30  This principle prohibits providers from disfavoring some sites in ways 
that fall short of blocking them.  For example, a broadband provider could not slow 
down disfavored sites, or offer favored sites, applications, or services (or those that 
are willing to pay for it) premium services.  Each of these prohibitive principles is 
tempered by an allowance for “reasonable network management.”31  The order 
allows broadband providers to take reasonable steps to “(1) reduce or mitigate the 
effects of congestion . . . ; (2) address traffic that is unwanted by users or harmful; 
(3) prevent the transfer of unlawful content; or (4) prevent the unlawful transfer of 
content.”32  The Order establishes that network management justifications will be 
balanced against its neutrality principles.33 
These rules and principles are generally in line with the vision of net neutrality 
that the FCC has espoused in net neutrality challenges leading up to the Order.  In an 
early precursor to the FCC Net-Neutrality Order, the agency investigated Madison 
River Communications, a regional provider of voice and DSL service, for blocking 
its customers from using voice-over-IP services such as Skype.34  The FCC and the 
company reached a consent decree in which Madison River agreed to pay $15,000 
and to stop blocking VOIP services.35  Though the Madison River investigation 
occurred five years prior to the Net-Neutrality Order, it is squarely one of the types 
of behavior that the FCC seeks to curb.  Madison River blocked a specific Internet 
                                                          
 
27
 Id.  
 
28
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29
 Id.  The Order explicitly gives more leeway to wireless broadband providers than to 
fixed providers because mobile broadband “is at an earlier stage in its development than fixed 
broadband and is evolving rapidly.”  Id. at ¶ 8.  The no-blocking restrictions that the order 
establishes for wireless providers appear to allow them to continue controlling the devices that 
may be used on their networks and the specific types of services, but if they offer web service, 
they may not selectively block some disfavored websites.  Id.  This is in line with the FCC’s 
arguments in Madison River Communications where it challenged (and ultimately entered a 
consent decree with) a regional wireless provider that blocked Voice-over-IP services that 
competed with its own voice services.  See In re Madison River Communications, 20 F.C.C.R. 
4295 (2005). 
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 Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 25, at ¶ 1. 
 
31
 Id. 
 
32
 Id. at ¶ 81. 
 
33
 Id. 
 
34
 See In re Madison River Communications, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005). 
 
35
 Id.  
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application, an action that today would violate the no-blocking provision.36  Though 
mobile broadband providers have more leeway to block than fixed providers, they 
may not block applications that compete with their voice or telephony services as 
VOIP does for a mobile phone network.37 
Madison River was a small company that was engaging in a violation of 
network-neutrality principles that was relatively small and at the time was novel.  
The FCC instituted a much larger case against a major player just a few years later.  
In Comcast v. FCC, the FCC identified and challenged another violation of the 
principles that it would later enshrine in the Report and Order.  The FCC challenged 
Comcast’s decision to interfere with Internet traffic related to the peer-to-peer file 
sharing service Bittorrent.38  Following a formal investigation, the FCC found that 
Comcast “significantly impeded consumers’ ability to access the content and use the 
applications of their choice.”39  Comcast changed its network management practices 
to comply with FCC policy, but subsequently challenged the FCC’s authority to 
order it to change its network management under the Communications Act of 1934, 
which allows the FCC to “perform any and all acts, make such rules and regulations, 
and issue such orders . . . as may be necessary in the execution of its functions.”40  
The FCC based its order on this ancillary authority in the absence of any direct grant 
of authority to order Internet service providers to alter their network management 
practices.41  The D.C. Circuit held that the congressional policy statements on which 
the FCC relied to support its authority were insufficient to grant ancillary jurisdiction 
over Comcast in the case.42   
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 Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 25, ¶ 88: 
We make clear that, for the singling out of any specific application for blocking or 
degradation based on harm to the network to be a reasonable network management 
practice, a broadband provider should be prepared to provide a substantive 
explanation for concluding that the particular traffic is harmful to the network, such as 
traffic that constitutes a denial-of-service attack on specific network infrastructure 
elements or exploits a particular security vulnerability. 
Further, Madison River sought to block VOIP services because they were in competition with 
its voice services.  Blocking of competing services receives special attention in the rules.  
Wireless broadband providers receive more leeway than fixed providers, but they are 
specifically prohibited from blocking competing services.  Id. 
 
37
 See id. 
 
38
 See Comcast Corp. v. Fed. Commc’ns Comm, 600 F.3d 642, 644-45 (D.C. Cir. 2010); 
Cecilia Kang, Court Rules for Comcast over FCC in ‘net neutrality’ case, WASH. POST. (Apr. 
7, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/04/06/AR2010040600742.html.  Bittorrent is notable for high-
volume Internet usage.  See BitTorrent, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BitTorrent 
(last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
 
39
 In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for 
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Rcd. 13,028, at 13,054 (2008). 
 
40
 47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2006). 
 
41
 See Comcast, 600 F.3d at 646. 
 
42
 Id. at 661.  Such authority requires the Commission “to tie its . . . ancillary authority . . . 
to . . . ‘statutorily mandated responsibility’ . . . .”  Id.  By finding this mandate absent, the 
Court vacated the FCCs order. 
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The FCC’s loss in Comcast led directly to the Net-Neutrality Order in which it 
simultaneously attempts to establish net-neutrality principles as clear-cut rules, and 
its authority to engage in such rulemaking.  The long-term fate of the Order is yet 
unclear.43  The FCC takes pains to establish its jurisdiction in ways that are different 
from those that the D.C. Circuit rejected in Comcast.  Rather than relying on 
ancillary jurisdiction, the FCC claims direct authority to implement net-neutrality 
rules under its statutory grant of authority to “encourage the deployment on a 
reasonable and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all 
Americans . . . .”44 
The FCC justifies the substance of its Network Neutrality Order as necessary to 
protect “innovation, investment, job creation, economic growth, competition, and 
free expression.”45  In addition to these general goals, the FCC Report announcing 
the Order identifies several more specific harms that it believes will occur in the 
absence of net-neutrality enforcement.  For example, the Report argues that 
broadband providers will limit free and open access to the Internet in harmful ways 
and that they have already began to do so.46  The Report and Order portrays a level 
of certainty regarding the likely outcome of an absence of net-neutrality regulation 
that is belied by the economic and legal literature.  There is significant debate as to 
whether innovation and Internet openness would decline in the absence of the net 
neutrality order.   
B.  Economic Views of Network Neutrality 
The FCC Net Neutrality Report and Order give the impression that economic 
scholarship is clearly in favor of the type of regulation that the FCC seeks to impose.  
But there is a great deal of disagreement.  Some economists argue that net neutrality 
is necessary, others argue that the innovation and competition that the FCC seeks to 
protect is best served without net neutrality regulation. 
One group of commentators generally concludes that though network neutrality 
principles may be good, rules enforcing those principles are unnecessary.  A leading 
voice in this group is Professor Christopher Yoo.  Yoo considers network neutrality 
principles in the context of the chain of production between creators of Internet 
                                                          
 
43
 There have been challenges to the FCC Order’s basis in the legislature and in courts.  
Shortly after the Order was approved by the FCC and before it was implemented, Verizon 
challenged the FCC’s authority to issue it.  Steve Augustino, Court Dismisses Verizon Net 
Neutrality Appeal—For Now, TELECOM LAW MONITOR (Apr. 5, 2011, 11:40 AM), 
http://www. telecomlawmonitor.com/2011/04/articles/broadband-1/court-dismisses-verizon-
net-neutrality-appeal-for-now/print.html.  This challenge has yet to reach a substantive 
decision.  The order also faces political opposition.  In April 2011, the House passed a bill that 
would revoke the FCC’s Net-Neutrality Order.  See Larry Downes, House Votes to Nullify Net 
Neutrality: What’s Next?, TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT (Apr. 12, 2011), 
http://techliberation.com/2011/04/12/house-votes-to-nullify-net-neutrality-whats-
next/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+techliberation
+%28Technology+Liberation+Front%29.  This move is unlikely to have any practical effect 
as the bill is unlikely to pass in the Senate or be signed by President Obama, but it 
demonstrates the politicization of the net-neutrality debate. 
 
44
 47 U.S.C. § 1302(a) (2006). 
 
45
 Preserving the Open Internet, supra note 25, ¶ 1. 
 
46
 Id. at 11-22. 
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applications and content, and consumers.47  Yoo sees vigorous competition between 
Internet applications—in part because network neutrality norms have allowed 
applications easy market entry.  For last-mile Internet connectivity, however, there is 
much less competition and network neutrality rules may make small-scale entry 
impossible.  Given this state of competition between applications and much less 
competition between last-mile providers, Yoo finds it anomalous that proposals to 
regulate network neutrality norms would reduce the ways in which last-mile 
providers may compete in order to promote and protect the already vigorous 
competition between applications.48  “[M]andating interoperability commodifies 
bandwidth in ways that sharply limit opportunities to compete on dimensions other 
than price, which reinforces the advantages enjoyed by the largest and most 
established players.”49  In the absence of network neutrality rules, Yoo argues, there 
may be new opportunities to compete to provide the last mile of Internet 
connectivity.  “Providers confronting cost disadvantages inherent in the smaller scale 
of their operations can survive by tailoring their networks to the needs of subgroups 
who value a particular type of network services particularly highly in much the same 
manner that specialty stores [s]urvive in a world dominated by one-stop shopping.”50  
In short, Yoo sees in network neutrality regulation the potential for a forced 
homogenization of Internet service providers, a process that allows the smallest 
possible range of providers of last-mile service.  If policy can encourage competition 
there, Yoo is relatively unconcerned that the current, robust competition in 
applications will be harmed—if there are multiple, competing access points to the 
Internet, violations of network neutrality principles will have little negative effect on 
competition.51 
Economist Gary Becker and colleagues reach a similar conclusion to Yoo, 
though they do not share his focus on a lack of competition in last-mile service.  
Instead, they find that “there is [already] significant and growing competition among 
broadband access providers,” and because of that competition, network neutrality 
regulation is unnecessary.52  At baseline, they see a competitive Internet access 
                                                          
 
47
 Christopher S. Yoo, Would Mandating Broadband Network Neutrality Help or Hurt 
Competition?  A Comment on the End-to-End Debate, 3 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 23, 
26-27 (2004) (“[A]ny chain of production is only as efficient as its least competitive link, 
which in the case of the Internet is undoubtedly the last mile.”). 
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 Id. 
 
49
 Id. at 28. 
 
50
 Id. at 27. 
 
51
 See Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral?: Tim Wu and 
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 584 (2007) (“Once a sufficient number of 
last-mile options exists, it would matter little if one network chose to make Yahoo! its 
preferred search engine.” (Yoo)); see also Adam Thierer, Are “Dumb Pipe” Mandates Smart 
Public Policy?  Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model, 3 J. 
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 275, 278 (2005) (“As broadband service providers (BSPs) and 
other Internet service and applications providers seek to expand and diversify their range of 
consumer offerings by integrating into other network layers, policymakers should not 
proscribe such layer-jumping.  Rather, they should be agnostic with regard to the intelligence 
of broadband networks in general.”). 
 
52
 Gary S. Becker, Dennis W. Carlton, & Hal S. Sider, Net Neutrality and Consumer 
Welfare, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 497, 498-99 (2010). 
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market that has strong incentives to invest in new technology and network upgrades.  
“[F]irms compete to attract new customers and retain existing ones by attempting to 
be the first to offer higher service quality as well as through price competition.”53  
Like Yoo, they see network neutrality regulation as an impediment to that 
competition: “Net neutrality . . . is properly considered a form of price regulation 
because it limits the form of pricing that can be practiced.  Such regulations thus 
limit a broadband provider’s revenue opportunities and its ability to differentiate 
itself from competitors, and thereby stifle incentives to invest and innovate.”54  Like 
Yoo, Becker and colleagues believe that in the absence of network neutrality 
regulation, service providers will not discriminate against specific Internet 
applications in the way that the FCC and other network neutrality advocates fear: 
“[A]ttempts by a broadband access provider to limit access to Internet content would 
likely result in the loss of subscribers that prefer unrestricted access, which, in turn, 
provides a competitive constraint that limits incentives for such actions.”55 
Professors Thomas Hazlett and Joshua Wright approach the problem from a 
slightly different angle, but also conclude that the Network Neutrality rules may 
harm innovation and competition.56  They identify a host of network neutrality 
violations that have long been a part of the Internet.57  The potential harm of these 
network neutrality violations is anticompetitive foreclosure.58  “Actions by firms 
resulting in this outcome are already illegal under the antitrust laws, where the ‘rule 
of reason’ is employed to separate socially beneficial practices form those that are 
harmful.  [Network Neutrality] goes far further than existing law, categorically 
prohibiting various forms of economic integration in a manner equivalent to 
antitrust’s per se rule . . . .  In this case . . . conduct that is typically highly efficient, 
promoting investment and innovation . . . .”59  For Hazlett and Wright, innovation 
stems not simply from trying to open a neutral Internet to all comers, but from 
allowing firms with an innovative product to enter into relationships to get that 
product to the masses.  For example, Hazlett and Wright identify an early source of 
Google’s growth: “[A] fledgling Google wagered its future by paying dominant ISP 
AOL to feature its search utility as a default application on its subscribers’ start-up 
page . . . .”60  It was only through a network neutrality violation that this Internet 
innovator was able to grow. 
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 Id. at 513. 
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 Id. at 502.  In other words, access providers will leave access to the platform alone 
when it is efficient to do so.  If it would be more efficient to sell limited Internet access at a 
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Another group of commentators takes the opposite approach.  Instead of seeing 
the potential for innovation to grow from business arrangements between existing 
Internet players, they see the source of innovation as Internet applications’ nearly 
costless access to the basic Internet platform.  Professor Tim Wu is a leading voice 
in this camp.  Wu fears that Internet service providers do have a monopoly on access 
to the Internet, and that they face a strong temptation to block or slow disfavored 
sites and applications—providing what he calls “access tiering.”  “[T]here are 
several problematic sides to access tiering.  You have, say, AT&T with a monopoly 
over broadband in a given area.  AT&T makes an exclusive deal with Yahoo! to 
provide preferred searches on AT&T’s network.  As a consequence, the Yahoo! 
engine loads faster than any of its competitors.”61   
In a recent book, Wu proposes a “Separations Principle” to protect innovation 
and easy and cheap entry to the Internet as a platform:   
A Separations Principle would mean the creation of a salutary distance 
between each of the major functions or layers in the information 
economy.  It would mean that those who develop information, those who 
own the network infrastructure on which it travels, and those who control 
the tools or venues of access must be kept apart from one another.62   
Returning to the focus of this Article, the Separations Principle would also mean that 
platform providers could not discriminate between or make special deals with some 
content providers or platform applications.  This Separations Principle is 
functionally very similar to network neutrality principles.   
Wu identifies three broad justifications for the Separations Principle which he 
draws from his historical examinations of communications industries.  First, Wu sees 
power that spreads across multiple levels of a communications industry as inherently 
corrupting.  “You cannot serve two masters, and the objectives of creating 
information are often at odds with those of disseminating it.”63  Second, and related, 
Wu justifies the separations principle as necessary to “prevent[] stagnation and 
repression of business innovation, especially repression abetted by the state.  [The 
Separations Principle] also promotes vitality and innovation in different parts of the 
information economy by preventing one layer from smothering the others.”64  This 
“smothering” is Wu’s primary fear related to the Internet—that gatekeepers to the 
platform will limit competition in platform applications.  However, as Farrell and 
Weiser point out, in many situations, platform owners may not have an incentive to 
do that, and in others, it may be useful for the platform to limit applications in order 
to remain competitive a platforms market.65  Further, it seems odd that his focus is 
                                                          
 
61
 Wu & Yoo, supra note 51, at 582.     
 
62
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on potential smothering of the vibrant applications market, rather than on restrictions 
on competition in the more limited market for Internet access.   
Wu’s perspective does not square well with Farrell & Weiser’s concept of 
internalizing complementary efficiencies.  ICE suggests that Internet service 
providers will not discriminate against some applications unless it will be efficient to 
do so, perhaps by allowing the service provider to lower prices and attract more 
customers.  Wu, however, has a host of counterarguments for why platform owners 
might not follow an efficient path, arguments that align neatly with the exceptions to 
ICE identified by Farrell & Weiser.  One exception to ICE is where the platform 
owner does not want applications to compete with some other source of revenue.  
Wu argues that this example is directly relevant: “If a product being offered over the 
network-say, Internet voice (“VoIP”) for $5 a month-competes with an established 
revenue source (telephone service, offered at $30 a month), the temptation to block it 
is strong.”66  Wu is also concerned that Internet service providers will fail to take the 
rational, efficient strategy suggested by ICE because they are not rational actors.  In 
the wireless network context, networks may limit technology that may be used on 
the network because they are following a harmful cultural model of how a network 
should operate.67  This model is one that was learned from the Bell telephone 
company, and it entails the company seeking, even against its best interest in 
attracting customers, to dominate every facet of its network.68 
Wu and Yoo present two extremes of the debate over network neutrality, but 
several commentators occupy a middle ground with less sweeping proposals.  For 
example, Professor James Speta argues that networks should be required to 
interconnect, but the details of the relationships between them should not be 
regulated. 
This proposed approach would require interconnection between 
backbones and other Internet carriers and between both Internet and 
telephone carriers . . . . It would not, however, require the fundamental 
unbundling associated with cable open access demands.  The 
interconnection requirement . . . ensures that the Internet remains a single 
                                                          
comes out soundly in favor of network neutrality.  “[A] vibrant information economy cannot 
countenance discrimination at a level so basic as transmission on a public network.  If the 
carrier is determined to capture greater profits, the carrier ought to be obliged to do so by 
expanding his capacity . . . .” Wu, supra note 62, at 311.  Wu explicitly rejects the benefits of 
competition other than uniform-product price competition.  Internet service providers may be 
better or worse, but they may not experiment with different offerings or pricing patterns. 
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 Wu & Yoo, supra note 51, at 578.  Wu acknowledges that in the presence of network 
neutrality regulation, the service provider could simply raise Internet connection prices to 
$25/month, making VoIP and telephone service the same price to the consumer.  But this is 
not a desirable outcome from a policy standpoint.  It stops the provider from charging 
different prices for phone and data services, which likely have very different demands, and 
mandates an inefficient, one-size-fits-all model. 
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 See Tim Wu, Wireless Net Neutrality: Cellular Carterfone and Consumer Choice in 
Mobile Broadband 27 (New Am. Found.: Wireless Future Program, Working Paper No. 17, 
2007), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/nafmigration/WorkingPaper17_Wireless 
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network, while limiting the threat that heavy-handed regulation would 
pose to the Internet’s vibrancy.69 
While Speta gives Internet service providers much more leeway than Wu, he would 
include a requirement that interconnection not be “unreasonably discriminatory.”70  
This might allow an Internet gatekeeper to offer its customers special speed or 
services for some types of applications, or offer higher speeds to applications that 
were willing to purchase it.  It most likely would not, however, allow an Internet 
service provider to select one search engine exclusively, blocking access to others. 
Though commentators are split on whether network neutrality principles are 
valuable and should be expanded, they have been well developed.  Those who argue 
that they should be expanded to cover higher-level Internet platforms draw on a set 
of rules that is stable enough to consider what that application might mean.  
However, network neutrality is not the only potential method of analysis for 
considering novel neutrality claims on Internet platforms.  The next section 
examines antitrust tying doctrine and its possible application to novel neutrality 
claims. 
IV.  ANTITRUST SCRUTINY OF TYING ARRANGEMENTS AND RECENT ATTEMPTS TO 
APPLY ANTITRUST TO INTERNET PLATFORMS 
The principles established in the FCC’s Network Neutrality Order do not create 
the only framework for examining discriminatory behavior by Internet-based 
platforms.71  In many cases, non-neutral behavior can be framed as tying 
arrangements or similar restraints.  Legal and economic scholars have long 
considered and developed tying doctrine.  Though the doctrine itself is imperfect, the 
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 Although network neutrality challenges to date have been based on the FCC’s 
regulatory authority, it is possible that network neutrality advocates could base a challenge on 
antitrust law.  Part IV examines ways in which antitrust law could be used to mount a 
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Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P., 540 U.S. 398, 402-05 (2004).  The parallel to 
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Trinko is the Act on which the FCC bases its authority for the Network Neutrality Report and 
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antitrust standards . . . .” Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407.  While the immediate effect of Trinko was to 
stop a neutrality-type claim from moving forward, a broader lesson from the case is that where 
neutrality claims fit within an existing antitrust framework, other neutrality regulations will 
not stop an antitrust case that touches on neutrality issues.  See Geoffrey Manne, Net 
Neutrality and Trinko, TRUTH ON THE MARKET (Apr. 4, 2011), 
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framework is well-suited to balance competing effects on competition and 
innovation that are at the heart of neutrality claims. 
It is not immediately obvious that neutrality claims focused on Internet platforms 
are attempts to restrict tying arrangements, but they can easily be re-framed as such.  
In a tying arrangement, a seller agrees to sell one product (the tying product) only if 
the purchaser will also buy a second product (the tied product).  In a famous 
example, a seller of canning machines and canning salt tied its machines to its salt, 
so that users of its machines could not purchase salt from its competitors.72  This 
framework is easily applied to the Internet platforms discussed in Part V.  For 
example, in blocking some apps that compete with its own proprietary app, Twitter 
has attempted to tie its own microblogging service to its app for creating and reading 
microblog posts.73  From the opposite perspective, traditional tying arrangements can 
be re-framed in terms of neutral access to a platform.  In the canning salt example 
above, the canning machine represents a canning platform that could potentially be 
used in conjunction with software (salt) from the platform owner or from other salt 
companies.  But the canning machine manufacturer, as the platform owner, closed 
the platform to outside developers (salt sellers), allowing only its own salt to 
interface with the machines. 
A.  The Basics of Tying Doctrine 
Courts analyze tying arrangements under what is known as the “quasi-per se 
rule.”74  It is similar to a per se rule in that a plaintiff is not required to identify 
specific anticompetitive effects of the tying arrangement, but three market conditions 
must be demonstrated before this per se illegality is triggered.75  A tying arrangement 
is per se illegal if and only if a substantial amount of interstate commerce is 
involved,76 the seller offers two products exclusively as a unit,77 and the seller has 
“economic power” in the market for the tying product.78  If these conditions are not 
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met, a tying arrangement may be analyzed under the default antitrust standard, the 
rule of reason. 
The simplest of the three prongs of the quasi-per se rule is the substantial amount 
of interstate commerce requirement which is easily met and seldom stops cases from 
moving forward.79  The Court has set a very lenient bar to establishing substantial 
volume: “normally the controlling consideration is simply whether a total amount of 
business, substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so as not to be merely de 
minimis, is foreclosed to competitors by the tie . . . .”80  In applying tying doctrine to 
Internet platforms, even those that offer free services, the substantial amount 
interstate commerce element is likely to be easily met by advertising or any sales 
that are associated with the platform or platform applications. 
The two-product requirement is somewhat more challenging.81  The Court has 
been clear that simply because a product may be split into its constituent parts, does 
not mean that it is two products, rather than one.  This distinction can be especially 
difficult in the Internet platform context where the value of the platform is often 
found largely or partly in its applications.  To make this distinction, the Court has 
established a general standard that a tying arrangement involves two products when 
there is demand for the tying and tied products to be purchased separately.  For 
example, in Jefferson Parish, the Court faced the question of whether anesthesia 
services and surgical services that require anesthesia are one or two products.82  The 
Court focused “not on the functional relation between [the two services], but rather 
on the character of the demand for the two items.”83  The Court framed this question 
as whether consumers consider and purchase anesthesiological services separately 
from the surgical services with which they are necessarily used.  The Court found 
that they do, and that surgery and anesthesia are different services operating in 
different markets.84  This element could present a special challenge in application to 
                                                          
 
79
 For example, in Fortner I, the Court did not discuss the possibility of denying a claim 
that involved less than $4 million in annual sales.  Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 
394 U.S. 495, 502 (1969) [“Fortner II”]. 
 
80
 Id. at 501.  Notably, the foreclosure rationale for scrutinizing tying arrangements is 
based on a tenuous rationale and has been largely abandoned by both economists and courts.  
See Jeffrey Paul Jarosch, Reassessing Tying Arrangements at the End of AT&T’s iPhone 
Exclusivity, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 297, 357-60 (2011). 
 
81
 At times, the two-product requirement is obviously met.  For example, in Northern 
Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), the Court did not question whether 
the land (the tying product) and shipping services (the tied product) were separate goods. 
 
82
 Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 6 (1984).  In that case, a hospital 
had agreed that all anesthesia services would be provided by a single anesthesiology practice.  
Id.  If hospital services are a single product that is made up of both surgical services and 
anesthesiological services, this agreement would not constitute a tying arrangement.  Instead, 
the agreement would simply shape the nature and value of the single service provided by the 
hospital.  Id. at 18–19.  If, on the other hand, surgery and anesthesia are two different services, 
the agreement effectively tied surgical services provided by any physician in the hospital to 
anesthesiology services provided by the selected anesthesiologists.  Id. 
 
83
 Id. at 19. 
 
84
 Id. at 22–23.  It based this holding on findings that surgery and anesthesia are billed 
separately, and that “patients or surgeons often request specific anesthesiologists to come to a 
hospital and provide anesthesia, and that the choice of an individual anesthesiologist separate 
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some Internet platforms.  For example, it is not entirely clear if the Twitter platform 
and the apps with which users interact with the platform are one or two products.85  
Some users may only use Twitter with these apps, never without them, while others 
may not use these apps at all. 
The third element of a tying case, economic power, once required “a 
monopolistic position,”86 but today’s standard allows a showing of economic power 
through a market share falling far short of monopoly,87 or by showing that the tying 
good is sufficiently unique to confer some power.88  The Court describes this 
economic power as 
                                                          
from the choice of a hospital is particularly frequent in respondent’s specialty.”  Id. at 22; see 
also Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (showing that the 
majority and the dissenters disagreed about whether advertisements in morning and evening 
papers occupied the same or different markets). 
 
85
 See infra Section V.c. for further application of tying doctrine to API neutrality. 
 
86
 See, e.g., Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 608–09.  In Times-Picayune, the Court found that 
the tying arrangement was not anticompetitive because the defendant lacked “dominance” 
over the tying advertising market.  Id. at 612–13.  However, as the dissent notes, this result 
was nearly certain given the excessively broad manner in which it defined the market. Id. at 
628; see also id. at 612–13 (describing the broad market definition to which the dissent 
refers). 
 
87
 Early cases did require the tying seller to occupy a “monopolistic position.”  See, e.g., 
Times-Picayune, 345 U.S. at 608–09.  However, later cases required only “economic power.”  
A large market share is one way to demonstrate market share, but the Court has established 
other ways.  “Market dominance . . . is by no means the only test of whether the seller has the 
requisite economic power.  Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic 
power may be inferred from the tying product’s desirability to consumers or from uniqueness 
in its attributes.”  United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962). 
 
88
 See, e.g., Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502-03 (1969): 
The standard of “sufficient economic power” does not, as the District Court held, 
require that the defendant have a monopoly or even a dominant position throughout 
the market for the tying product.  Our tie-in cases have made unmistakably clear that 
the economic power over the tying product can be sufficient . . . even though the 
power exists only with respect to some of the buyers in the market . . . . As we said in 
the Loew’s case: “Even absent a showing of market dominance, the crucial economic 
power may be inferred from the tying product’s desirability to consumers or from 
uniqueness in its attributes.” (citation omitted). 
In Fortner II, the Court refined this test to require that 
[T]he seller has the power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to 
require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a 
completely competitive market.  In short, the question is whether the seller has some 
advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for the tying product. 
U.S. Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610, 620 (1977) [hereinafter “Fortner II”].  
The Court recently (and wisely) abandoned one indicator of market power, the presence of a 
patent.  Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 31 (2006) (“We conclude that 
the mere fact that a tying product is patented does not support . . . a presumption [of market 
power.]”). 
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[T]he power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to 
require purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted 
in a completely competitive market.  In short, the question is whether the 
seller has some advantage not shared by his competitors in the market for 
the tying product.89 
Though the Court’s tying doctrine has been unchanged for years,90 it may not be 
as stable as it appears.  Justice O’Connor openly challenged the quasi-per se rule in 
her concurrence in Jefferson Parish.91  The Court sees the potential for a weak 
product to be protected by the power of a strong product in another, tied market.  But 
the Court fails to consider the negative effects that such an arrangement could have 
on the competitors engaging in it.  If a strong product does indeed allow a weak 
product to gain market share on its coattails, the attachment of the weak product will 
reduce the strong product’s draw.  This undercuts the Court’s assumption that tying 
is used to protect tied products from competition, and the very basis for the quasi-per 
se rule.  Instead, gains made by the tied product are likely to be offset by losses to 
the tying product.92  Though the Court has not resolved this tension, several dissents 
and concurrences have attempted to identify other rationales and methods for 
antitrust scrutiny of tying arrangements.  This debate mirrors the economic debate, 
discussed in Part II, over whether and when a closed platform or one that 
discriminates between applications may cause competitive harm. 
The first example of this is in Justice White’s dissent to Fortner Enterprises v. 
United States Steel (“Fortner I”).93  Justice White sought to identify specific 
economic harms that tying may cause.  He identified two primary harms that may 
stem from tying arrangements where the tying product has economic power: “the use 
of power over one product [(1)] to attain power over another, [and (2)] otherwise to 
distort freedom of trade and competition in the second product.”94  Justice White 
thought that tying could allow a monopolist to use one monopoly to gain another, or 
could cause “distortions” in the tied market by forcing non-tied competitors out of 
the tied market or by making it difficult to enter the tied market. 
                                                          
 
89
 Fortner II, 429 U.S. at 620. 
 
90
 Cf. Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 9–10 (“It is far too late in the 
history of our antitrust jurisprudence to question the proposition that certain tying 
arrangements pose an unacceptable risk of stifling competition and therefore are unreasonable 
‘per se.’  The rule was first enunciated in International Salt Co. v. United States . . . and has 
been endorsed by this Court many times since.  The rule also reflects congressional policies 
underlying the antitrust laws.”). 
 
91
 Id. at 35. 
 92 The Court attempted to get around this paradox by imposing the market power 
requirement.  The only products that may shelter tied products from the forces of competition 
are those with market power.  The problem is that the seller still faces a tradeoff between 
raising prices, which ordinarily raises no competitive concern, and tying, which does.  
Without some theory as to why imposing a tying arrangement is worse for consumers or for 
competition than simply raising prices, there is no justification for condemning tying 
arrangements. 
 
93
 Fortner Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 510 (1969) (White, J., 
dissenting). 
 
94
 Id. at 512. 
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The idea that one monopoly may be “leveraged” into another using a tying 
arrangement has been extensively considered and for the most part discredited.95  
Market “distortions,” however, are where most commentators now look for harm 
from tying arrangements—this is the angle taken by Justice O’Connor in her 
concurrence in Jefferson Parish.96  O’Connor attempts to reform tying doctrine 
under the rule of reason, focusing on the economic consequences of potentially 
anticompetitive business practices.   
O’Connor begins by carefully spelling out the distortions that ties can have on a 
market.  She then lays out a doctrine that aims to identify those arrangements that 
will have such negative effects.  The basic harm that O’Connor sees in tying 
arrangements, (or in exclusive, closed platforms) is that they may “have a 
demonstrable exclusionary impact in the tied product [(or applications)] market . . . 
.”
97
  This is only a problem when the impact is to make the tied market less 
competitive.98  O’Connor sees this possibility in two situations—in neutrality terms, 
exclusivity can be a problem when: the closing of a platform either drives out 
existing application makers, or meaningfully raises barriers to entry to an 
applications market.99  In other words, a closed platform alone is not sufficient to 
demonstrate anticompetitive harm.  It obviously raises the barriers to entry into the 
applications market for that platform, but O’Connor’s tying analysis is not 
implicated unless it makes a broader applications market, including other platforms, 
less competitive.  Notably, these are the same types of harms identified by 
economists focusing on platform decisions to open or close.  As Farrell and Weiser 
demonstrate with ICE, when only a single platform and the applications associated 
with that platform are involved, the platform owner is likely to open the platform 
when it is efficient to do so. 
O’Connor proposes specific rules for the analysis of tying arrangements.  Her 
analysis overlaps with, but is meaningfully different from the quasi-per se rule, and 
is easily applied to novel neutrality claims on Internet platforms.  First, she adopts 
                                                          
 
95
 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 199 (2d ed. 2001) (“It may seem 
obvious that two monopolies are better than one, but since the products are used in 
conjunction with one another to produce the final product or service in which the consumer is 
interested . . . , it is far from obvious.”); ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 372–75 
(1978); Ward S. Bowman, Jr., Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 
19, 20–23 (1957); Aaron Director & Edward H. Levi, Law and the Future: Trade Regulation, 
51 NW. U. L. REV. 281, 290–92 (1956).  
 
96
 See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 36 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring).   
 
97
 Id.  
 
98
 See id. at 36 (“Tying may be economically harmful primarily in the rare cases where 
power in the market for the tying product is used to create additional market power in the 
market for the tied product.”). 
 
99
 Note that if the platform does not have market power, its discrimination is unlikely to 
cause barriers to entry that extend to a broader applications market.  Nor does each platform 
have a distinct applications market separate from applications markets associated with 
competing platforms.  Cf. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 
471 (1992) (holding that Kodak may have market power in a parts and repair market for its 
machinery, where its machines do not have power in the market for that type of machine). 
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two of the three requirements of the quasi-per se rule: the two product requirement 
and market power requirements.100 
In addition to these two requirements drawn from the quasi-per se rule, 
O’Connor also requires evidence of a likely negative effect on competition from the 
tying arrangement.   
[T]here must be a substantial threat that the tying seller will acquire 
market power in the tied-product market.  No such threat exists if the tied-
product market is occupied by many stable sellers who are not likely to be 
driven out by the tying, or if entry barriers in the tied-product market are 
low.101  
This requirement is especially important in the common situation where applications 
makers provide applications over several platforms.  A single platform excluding 
disfavored or competing applications makers from one platform in a competitive 
market can have no real harm, so long as the other platforms remain available.102 In a 
less competitive platform market, the risks to the tied applications market targeted by 
O’Connor’s analysis are the potential for competition in that market to be reduced by 
the tied good obtaining market power and forcing other competitors out, or obtaining 
market power and significantly raising barriers to entry for other would-be 
participants in the tied applications market.  These foci—requiring market power in 
the tying platform market and watching the tied applications market for foreclosure 
and exclusion—are consistent with the platform economics discussed in Section II. 
By focusing on actual effects of an arrangement, O’Connor departs from the 
quasi-per se rule.  Rather than leading to a conclusion of illegality, her requirements 
are threshold questions for an analysis of potential illegality.  “The ultimate decision 
whether a tie-in is illegal under the antitrust laws should depend upon the 
demonstrated economic effects of the challenged agreement.  It may, for example, be 
entirely innocuous that the seller exploits its control over the tying product to ‘force’ 
the buyer to purchase the tied product.”103  In applying tying analyses to neutrality 
                                                          
 
100
 See Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 37-39.  She does not adopt the substantial amount of 
interstate commerce requirement, but it has very seldom had teeth in analyzing tying 
arrangements.  Her market power requirement basically adopts the Courts existing rule, but 
she puts her own emphasis on the two-product requirement:   
For products to be treated as distinct, the tied product must, at a minimum, be one that 
some consumers might wish to purchase separately without also purchasing the tying 
product.  When the tied product has no use other than in conjunction with the tying 
product, a seller of the tying product can acquire no additional market power by 
selling the two products together.  
Id. at 39.  This standard is significantly more demanding than the Court’s two market 
standard, and would make direct application of O’Connor’s tying analysis to platform 
neutrality claims difficult, since by definition, a platform application cannot be used without 
the platform, regardless of whether the two are available in a single or separate markets.  For 
this reason, the analysis proposed in Section VI draws on both the Court’s doctrine and 
O’Connor’s framework to reach a slightly less stringent two-product analysis. 
 
101
 Id. at 38. 
 
102
 This situation is especially relevant to digital markets and API. See infra Sections V.c 
and V.d. 
 
103
 Jefferson Parish, 466 U.S. at 41 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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claims, this is an especially important insight.  Though commentators disagree on 
whether and when platform neutrality is necessary, the debate strongly suggests that 
the value of neutrality and platform openness is context specific, and that actions that 
violate neutrality principles may have value. 
V.  APPLICATION OF NETWORK NEUTRALITY AND ANTITRUST FRAMEWORKS TO 
THREE INTERNET PLATFORMS 
Network neutrality debates began with a firm connection to the physical pipes 
and basic access points on which the Internet is built.  The debate was a reaction to 
the potential for the owners of infrastructure to block, slow, or toll parts of the 
Internet for some portion of users.  Network neutrality advocates urge that policies 
governing access to the Internet itself must be neutral.  But recently, the concept of 
neutrality has reached beyond the ways in which consumers access the Internet to the 
Internet platforms and services that they use once they get there.  Instead of focusing 
on access to Internet platforms and services being in some way neutral, the new 
debate is over whether Internet-based platforms must themselves be neutral.  Some 
of these platform neutrality debates have become familiar terms—including those 
specifically addressed here: search neutrality, API neutrality, and online marketplace 
neutrality. 
Each of these novel neutrality claims focuses on a platform that is built upon the 
Internet platform.104  One of the most prominent of these new neutralities focuses on 
Internet search—whether search engines must remain neutral to all Internet content 
or may promote or hold back some sites in their search algorithms.  This section 
examines search neutrality, API neutrality, and online marketplace neutrality claims.  
It considers each neutrality type and the platforms to which they are applied under 
both network neutrality and antitrust principles.  For each of these “higher-level” 
Internet platforms there have been specific calls to extend network neutrality 
principles.  For example, even as the FCC Network Neutrality Rule was proposed, 
the founder of the specialized search engine Foundem argued that their focus only on 
broadband providers was too narrow:  
The Federal Communications Commission has proposed “network 
neutrality” rules, which would prohibit Internet service providers from 
discriminating against or charging premiums for certain services or 
applications on the Web.  The commission is correct that ensuring equal 
access to the infrastructure of the Internet is vital, but it errs in directing 
its regulations only at service providers like AT&T and Comcast.105   
                                                          
 
104
 For this reason I refer to these platforms as higher-level Internet platforms. 
 
105
 Adam Raff, Op-Ed., Search, but You May Not Find, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2009, at A27, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/28/opinion/28raff.html.  Raff continued to 
argue that major search engines, too, should be covered by neutrality rules.   
Today, search engines like Google, Yahoo and Microsoft’s new Bing have become the 
Internet’s gatekeepers, and the crucial role they play in directing users to Web sites 
means they are now as essential a component of its infrastructure as the physical 
network itself.  The F.C.C. needs to look beyond network neutrality and include 
“search neutrality” . . . .  
Id. 
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In examining these novel neutrality claims on Internet platforms, I demonstrate that 
neither of these frameworks works well for analyzing novel neutrality claims.  
Section VI proposes reforms to these frameworks. 
A.  Unique Characteristics of Internet Platforms 
These higher-level neutralities have meaningful structural and substantive 
differences from typical network neutrality.  These differences make it impossible or 
harmful to apply network neutrality values to them and demonstrate the imperfection 
of antitrust rules for analyzing them.  There are three key differences between the 
Internet gatekeepers to which network neutrality principles are applied and these 
higher-level platforms—these characteristics also distinguish them from the goods 
and services to which antitrust laws have most frequently been applied.  
First, use of one Internet platform usually does not preclude a user from also 
using a competing platform.  This is much less true of broadband providers, the 
targets of the FCC Neutrality Rule.  A consumer who purchases broadband service 
from one company may switch to a direct competitor, but is very unlikely to 
patronize more than one fixed provider at a time, or more than one wireless 
broadband provider at a time.  Search engines provide the opposite extreme.  If a 
user is dissatisfied with the results returned by one search engine, they can quickly 
re-run the search on another.  Most search engines have extremely low learning costs 
to a user who has used any search engine.  For other Internet platforms, switching 
costs may be higher—for example switching between social networks may be 
difficult, and may require convincing others to also migrate to a new platform.  
However, unlike broadband providers, a user can reasonably use multiple social 
networks, and thus can transition gradually between them or use them 
simultaneously for different purposes.  Facebook and Twitter provide a useful 
example.  It is common for users to belong to both social networks.  Some users may 
use one for some purposes and another for others.  Many applications are available 
that allow a user to use both networks at once without clearly distinguishing between 
the two.106 
Second, because switching costs between higher-level Internet platforms tend to 
be low, an inferior platform is unlikely to be able to maintain market power for long.  
In some ways, switching costs are able to imitate market power by locking 
customers in.  To overtake a competitor, a platform or service must not only be 
better, but must be sufficiently better to justify incurring the costs of the switch.107  
This can slow down the effects of competition.  Because competition generally is 
likely to be more efficient in higher level Internet platforms than in broadband 
                                                          
 
106
 A cottage industry has sprung up around social networks for the major purpose of 
facilitating use of multiple social networks.  For example, there are a number of apps and 
services that allow users to post or read messages from many social networks at once.  See 
Jaymar Cabebe, HootSuite, TweetDeck, or Seesmic?, THE DOWNLOAD BLOG (Aug. 5, 2011, 
4:43 PM), http://download.cnet.com/8301-2007_4-20088869-12/hootsuite-tweetdeck-or-
seesmic/. 
 
107
 See Joseph Farrell & Paul Klemperer, Coordination and Lock-in: Competition with 
Switching Costs and Network Effects, in 3 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 1974 
(Mark Armstrong & Robert Porter eds., 2007) (1967) (“[S]witching costs can segment an 
otherwise undifferentiated  market as firms focus on their established customers and do not 
compete aggressively for their rivals’ buyers, letting oligopolists extract positive profits.”). 
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providers, it is difficult to justify application of neutrality principles to higher-level 
platforms without identifying specific harms caused by their violation.  Though 
switching costs are likely to be low, the platforms examined here each have some 
level of network effects making market entrance more difficult by giving larger 
platforms an advantage over less-established platforms.  There is also variation in the 
switching costs imposed by Internet platforms.  Search engines have low switching 
costs—users of one search engine generally can immediately switch to another.  But 
social networks may have higher switching costs, since part of the value of the 
network is not its technical superiority, but the fact that a user’s friends also use it.  
Importantly, though these network effects may make market entry more difficult, an 
effect that makes a popular service better does not inherently harm consumers in any 
obvious way. 
Third, higher-level Internet platforms are more likely than broadband providers 
to rely on violations of neutrality principles for their basic business models.  Though 
Professor Yoo argues that allowing broadband providers to violate network 
neutrality principles can foster competition between them, it is possible for them to 
compete transparently without blocking or unreasonably discriminating between 
Internet applications.  For search engines, on the other hand, discrimination between 
search results is the very service on which they compete—the best search engine is 
the one that best discriminates between potential search results.108  Similarly, 
enforcing a strong transparency principle would hamper competition by reducing 
engine’s ability to differentiate—anyone could copy the most successful search 
engines.  Search engines would then have to compete on some factor other than the 
service that is at the heart of what they do—search. 
The remainder of this Section examines three of these higher-level Internet 
platforms that have faced novel neutrality claims and applies network neutrality and 
antitrust frameworks to them. 
B.  Search Neutrality 
Calls for neutrality-based regulation of search engines have recently become 
common.  In the United States, as in much of the world, regulation of search means 
regulation of the currently dominant search engine, Google.  While other search 
engines occupy meaningful shares of the market, none have faced the threat of 
regulation that Google does.  That threat has recently become very real.  In June, 
2011, the FTC launched a broad probe into Google’s search and advertising 
practices.109  It is uncertain if this probe will result in any action against Google, but 
it demonstrates that a major U.S. enforcement agency is looking closely at Google 
and search neutrality.110  Two United States Senators have also urged the FTC to 
                                                          
 
108
 This fact requires search neutrality to focus on the more difficult question of whether 
the discrimination between search results is appropriate, rather than simply aiming to identify 
whether there is such discrimination. 
 
109
 See Joe Mullin, Google Defends Itself on Antitrust as States Pile On, PAIDCONTENT.ORG 
(June 24, 2009, 12:24 PM), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-google-defends-itself-on-
antitrust-as-states-pile-on/. 
 
110
 Commissioner Thomas Rosch has indicated that the FTC might like to challenge 
Google under its authority to regulate unfair methods of competition rather than under more 
traditional antitrust standards because a “Section 5” case would not require any demonstration 
of harm to competition.  See Geoffrey Manne & Joshua Wright, The FTC Makes its Google 
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investigate whether Google favors its own products in its search results.111  In 
Europe, where Google occupies a larger share of the market than it does in the 
United States, the case against Google is well underway.112 
The FTC investigation and the EU case follow a series of calls, from both 
commentators and Google competitors, for search neutrality enforcement.  As with 
other Internet neutralities, search neutrality fears tend to focus on the possibility that 
the platform will favor some content providers over others, giving users a product 
that is harmfully non-neutral.  Some companies have made specific complaints that 
Google disfavors or de-lists their websites, and such complaints have led to a formal 
investigation in the EU.  In the U.S., TripAdvisor.com, WebMD.com, Yelp.com, and 
Citysearch.com have complained that their sites have been pushed down in Google 
Searches as Google-owned products have been introduced at the top of search 
results.113  Google has responded to these concerns by attempting to focus on search 
users, not the content providers that may appear in search results: “We built Google 
for users, not websites, and our goal is to give users answers . . . .”114  Nonetheless, 
businesses built upon websites argue that being prominent among the returns to a 
common search on Google is essential for some business models to succeed.115  In 
this environment, search engine optimization, or simply SEO,116 has become a 
cottage industry.117 
Concerns over the potential harm caused by search engine tinkering have led 
commentators to argue that neutrality principles should be applied to search engines, 
and to Google in particular.  Not surprisingly, claims that network-neutrality 
                                                          
Investigation Official, now What?, TECHNOLOGY LIBERATION FRONT (June 24, 2011), 
http://tech liberation.com/2011/06/24/the-ftc-makes-its-google-investigation-official-now-
what/?utm_ 
source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+techliberation+%28Tech
nology+Liberation+Front%29. 
 
111
  Matt McGee, US Senators Call for FTC Investigation into Google’s Search Results, 
SEARCH ENGING LAND (Dec. 19, 2011 ), http://searchengineland.com/us-senators-call-
for-ftc-investigation-into-googles-search-results-105131 . 
 
112
 See Rob D. Young, Report: Google EU Antitrust Expands, Up to 9 Complainants, 
SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Aug. 3, 2011), 
http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2098919/Report-Google-EU-Antitrust-Expands-Up-to-
9-Complainants; Mathew Ingram, Google Fights Growing Battle Over “Search Neutrality”, 
GIGAOM (Dec. 17, 2010, 8:30 AM), http://gigaom.com/2010/12/17/google-antitrust-search-
neutrality/. 
 
113
 See Amir Efrati, Rivals Say Google Plays Favorites, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2010, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405274870405870457601563 
018856897 2.html. 
 
114
 Id. 
 
115
 See id. (“The complaints underscore how crucial Google searches are to virtually every 
business online, and the increasingly close scrutiny of how Google operates.”). 
 
116
 Search engine optimization, often referred to simply as “SEO” is a euphemism for 
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principles should be applied to search engines have been led by Internet service 
providers to whom network neutrality is already applicable.  Comcast has argued 
that “If the [FCC] were to conclude that an interventionist regulatory regime is 
needed to preserve the ‘neutrality’ of the Internet, it could not defensibly apply that 
regime to broadband providers but not to Google.”118  Similarly, AT&T has argued 
that search engines “determine the information . . . that customers access online 
through algorithms that highlight some information, favor certain websites, and even 
omit some sites altogether.”119 
Following these concerns, some commentators have argued that direct oversight 
of the neutrality of search algorithms is necessary.  For example, Professors 
Benjamin Edelman and Benjamin Lockwood find evidence consistent with the 
existence of search bias and argue that 
[A]s Google becomes even more dominant, we envision substantially 
greater investigation of the effect of Google's linking policies, ultimately 
including deeper outside verification and oversight . . . . In the long run, 
just as Windows source code and APIs are subject to outside scrutiny, we 
expect that search algorithms will require similar external review.120   
Edelman and Lockwood find that search engines, particularly Google, are likely to 
include their own sites and services as the first or one of the first returns to a set of 
typical searches.121  However, as Edelman and Lockwood acknowledge, it is not 
obvious that these results indicate bias.  If search engines attempt to provide useful 
results, it is possible that Google users find Gmail to be a useful return to “mail,” 
while Yahoo users find Yahoo Mail to be a useful return.122  Though their results 
suggest the possibility of but do not demonstrate bias, Edelman and Lockwood fear 
that search engines bias their results “to expand into new sectors, to grant instant free 
traffic to their own new services, and to block competitors and would-be 
competitors. The incentive for bias is all the stronger because the lack of obvious 
benchmarks makes most bias would be difficult to uncover.”123 
Edelman and Lockwood are not alone in envisioning agency oversight of search.  
A 2010 New York Times editorial suggested that Google should “explain with some 
specified level of detail the editorial policy that guides its tweaks.  Another 
[possibility] would be to give some government commission the power to look at 
                                                          
 
118
 Nate Anderson, Regulating Google’s Results? Law Prof Calls “Search Neutrality” 
Incoherent, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2011, 6:40 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2011/01/regulating-googles-results-law-prof-calls-search-neutrality-
incoherent.ars. 
 
119
 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
120
 Benjamin Edelman & Benjamin Lockwood, Measuring Bias in “Organic” Web Search, 
http://www.benedelman.org/searchbias/ (last visited Nov.. 15, 2011). 
 
121
 Id. 
 
122
 Edelman and Lockwood find that the first few results in any search tend to be the links 
on which users click.  This, again, is consistent with search result patterns representing either 
usefulness or bias. 
 
123
 Id. 
28https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol59/iss4/5
2012] NOVEL “NEUTRALITY” CLAIMS AGAINST INTERNET PLATFORMS 565 
 
those tweaks.”124  Professors Oren Bracha and Frank Pasquale explicitly call for such 
a “Federal Search Commission.”125  They focus as much on the need to protect the 
Internet as a forum for democratic speech as on protecting economic competition 
and conclude that either “application and adaptation of common law duties to public 
utilities, or the creation of a regulatory framework” to regulate search engines is 
necessary to protect against search engine manipulation.126  Elsewhere, Pasquale has 
spelled out the bounds of search neutrality that he believes should be enforced by 
such a federal agency.  His search neutrality principles are generally more modest 
and less intrusive than the network neutrality rules.127   Specifically, Pasquale argues 
that search engines should not engage in two behaviors:  
 
1) Stealth marketing (secretly taking cash or other consideration in exchange 
for elevating the profile of sites in organic search results)[; and]  
2) De-indexing without notice and explanation (removing legal, non-spam 
sites from the index after they have been included in the search engine’s 
corpus, and failing to give some explanation to the removed site as to why 
it was removed)[.]128   
 
As Professor James Grimmelman points out, much of Pasquale’s proposal fits 
neatly under the transparency principle.129  Stealth marketing and de-indexing are 
roughly analogous to unreasonable discrimination and no-blocking, but Pasquale’s 
criticism of each of these rests not on the search engine’s ability to block or 
discriminate against a potential search return, but on its ability to do so opaquely.   
Others argue that even the more modest search neutrality principles are 
unnecessary.  For example, Grimmelman identifies eight search neutrality 
principles130 and finds that they are “unusable as bases for sound search 
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regulation.”131  Grimmelman argues generally that neutrality is incompatible with the 
enterprise of search, which has the very purpose of helping users discriminate 
between websites.132 
1.  Neutrality-Based Scrutiny of Search 
In the context of this rigorous debate surrounding search neutrality, it is clear that 
straightforward application of network neutrality principles—transparency, no 
blocking, and no unreasonable discrimination—to search neutrality makes little 
sense.  Transparency raises serious problems for businesses competing in the search 
market.  No commercial search engine will be willing to disclose anything more than 
general information regarding the algorithm and code that it uses to select, prioritize, 
and sort possible returns to a search.  To require such a disclosure to users would be 
to enable copying of the algorithm, which is a primary asset of a search engine.  
Ultimately, such a requirement could make search an untenable business.  It might 
be possible for a search engine to disclose some information to regulators, rather 
than directly to consumers, but this would not serve the purpose behind the 
transparency principle—to provide consumers with information about the search 
engines between which they are choosing.  In search, it may be necessary for 
consumers to choose between search engines based on the results that they obtain 
from using an engine, rather than transparency of the algorithm that creates those 
results.  Given the low costs to consumers to switch between search products and the 
ability to experiment cheaply with different products, a lack of transparency should 
not allow one search engine to gain an edge over others, or harm consumers in some 
other way.  The results of a search, rather than the process that creates them, are the 
real product in which consumers are interested. These results are inherently 
transparent. 
Blocking and unreasonable discrimination also pose a problem.  Discrimination 
between different possible search results is the primary basis on which search 
engines compete.  Ceteris paribus, the search engine that returns more useful results 
will attract the most users.  It is possible, however, that search engines could 
discriminate in less desirable ways133—critics have identified two types of 
discrimination and blocking that they argue are unreasonable: discrimination on 
behalf of websites affiliated with the search engine and arbitrary blocking or 
demotion of a site in the search algorithm. 
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Edelman and Lockwood argue that the potential bias created by surreptitious 
discrimination and blocking justifies government review.  While there are legitimate 
arguments for targeting specific types of discrimination, the network neutrality 
principles provide no principled way to separate necessary discrimination from bad 
discrimination.134  Instead, they distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable 
discrimination in ways that are not usefully applicable to search.  For example, the 
Report and Order allows for “reasonable network management,”135 and “[u]se-
agnostic discrimination[.]”136  Network management simply does not apply in any 
clear way to search results.  Use-agnostic discrimination allows “[d]ifferential 
treatment of traffic that does not discriminate among specific uses of the network or 
classes of uses . . . . Use-agnostic discrimination . . . does not interfere with end 
users’ choices about which content, applications, services, or devices to use.”137  
Every search engine aims not to “interfere with end users’ choices” but to facilitate 
those choices.  Of course, the difference between facilitation and interference is only 
one of success vs. failure.  This process, the process in which search engines 
necessarily engage, explicitly treats different uses differently.  Everyone using a 
search engine wants to search, but a person wanting to search for shoes will be 
treated differently by a successful search engine than a person searching for driving 
directions.  The results of the two searches could be usefully arrived at in different 
ways.  There is no reason for the mechanism underlying the search engine not to 
recognize that terms in each search should lead to different sets of results (products 
for one and maps for the other).  Thus, search has a valuable element that is not use-
agnostic.  Network neutrality principles suggest that this pro-competitive process of 
arriving at individualized and useful search results should lead to strong scrutiny of 
search engines.  But that they target pro-competitive practices that make search 
better for consumers suggests that these principles are missing something when 
transferred to search.  
2.  Antitrust Scrutiny of Search 
Search neutrality borrows the terms of network neutrality, but it fits more easily 
into the framework of an antitrust tying analysis.  Under such an analysis, when a 
search engine favors some results over others, especially when it favors its own 
products or those of its business partners, the search engine functions as the tying 
good (and the platform for specific search results) and the products and websites that 
receive favored treatment are the tied good (and the platform application or 
software).  The analogy is imperfect because the tie is not exclusive.  If a search 
engine favors one search result, it does not do so to the absolute exclusion of other 
potential results—websites are more likely to be discriminated against in their 
ranking than to be absolutely blocked.  But this may be a distinction without a 
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difference.  There is a limit to how far into search results a user will look, and lower 
results are less likely to be clicked.138  Any loosening of the tying arrangement 
makes competitive harm less likely, because rather than being required to take a 
single search result in exchange for using a search engine, search discrimination just 
makes it easier and more likely that a user will choose the favored result with a more 
prominent listing.139  Nonetheless, analysis of search neutrality under a tying 
framework provides valuable insights into when search neutrality claims have merit.  
Recall that under the basic tying doctrine, the quasi-per se rule is triggered upon a 
showing that there are two products, that the tying product has economic power, and 
that a substantial portion of commerce is involved.140 
A search engine as the tying platform and search results as tied good likely 
would satisfy the two product requirement.  The two markets are the market for 
whatever the user is searching for and the market for search engines.  Both are 
vigorously competitive.141  There can be little doubt that users generally see the two 
market decisions as separate and make each decision separately.142  A user looking 
for a website that reviews shoes is unlikely to expect that they will end up at a much 
different site based on the search engine they use—in fact they are likely to choose 
the search engine that they think will most easily lead them to the most useful 
website.  Clearly there are separate markets for search engines, and for the web 
pages that compete to get users’ attention, often through good placement in popular 
search engines. 
The next question is whether the tying platform—here a search engine—has 
market power.  This, of course, is a specific inquiry for the competitor at issue, but 
today, a Court would be likely to find that Google has market power in search.  
Given Google’s hefty share of the web search market, it would likely be difficult for 
it to argue that it does not have market power—but it is not clear that this is the 
correct result under the doctrine established by the Court.  The Court looks not for 
some market share, but for economic power.  It defines market power as “[T]he 
power, within the market for the tying product, to raise prices or to require 
purchasers to accept burdensome terms that could not be exacted in a completely 
competitive market.  In short, the question is whether the seller has some advantage 
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not shared by his competitors in the market for the tying product.”143  Google’s 
power to raise prices or to impose burdensome terms is limited.  As Google is fond 
of emphasizing, its “[c]ompetition is just one click away.”144  The thing that keeps 
Google in its market share is its lack of burdensome terms and the usefulness of its 
results, not a special ability to keep users locked into an inferior search engine.   
However, Google does have two advantages not shared by its competitors.  First, 
it offers a wide variety of services that draw users in to its ecosystem, including 
Maps, Gmail, Google+ and many others.  By offering all of these services, some of 
which incur costs if a user decides to switch to another service, Google is able to 
keep users within its site for multiple services, simply because it is easier to keep 
using a trusted Google service than to try an upstart.145  Furthermore, Google may 
benefit from network effects inherent in search whereby the more users that 
patronize a single search engine, the more search data that engine has to improve its 
services making it harder for competitors to catch up.146  These effects may soften 
competition in Internet search, and combined with its market share, it is likely that a 
court would find Google to possess the market power necessary to a tying claim.   
A challenge that sought to apply tying doctrine to search neutrality could be 
successful against Google if it was able to demonstrate that the search engine’s 
algorithm systematically favored certain search results in other markets.  But like the 
result obtained by application of neutrality principles, it is not clear that this is the 
right result.  Search bias, even if it favors the search engine’s own products or those 
of its partners, may be a method of competition.  As Professor Joshua Wright argues, 
such “bias” could increase the value of search engines by becoming a factor on 
which they compete—the winner might not be the engine with the least bias, but the 
one with the most useful bias.147  In other words, in what Edelman and Lockwood 
call bias, Wright sees search engines providing users with useful results.  
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Importantly, Google is not the only search engine in which Edelman and Lockwood 
find bias: “Evidence that other search engines with much smaller market shares . . . 
exhibit similar bias would suggest to most economists that the practice certainly has 
some efficiency justifications.”148   Tying doctrine has been criticized for allowing 
successful challenges to business activities that are themselves forms of competition, 
without evidence that they are causing competitive harm.149   Here, it is not clear that 
any competitive harm will actually arise from the type of search bias that search 
neutrality advocates accuse Google of engaging in.   
Justice O’Connor’s extra steps of analysis prove useful in considering this 
possibility.  She proposes a tying analysis that begins with the steps of the quasi-per 
se rule, but then considers the likely effects of the tie and any pro-competitive 
effects.  Application of this extra analytical step demonstrates that search neutrality 
is not a major competitive concern and that regulation of search is unfounded as a 
method to promote competition.  The first question posed in O’Connor’s additional 
analysis is whether the non-neutral action by the platform owner (here the alleged 
favoring of some search results over others) is likely either to force some 
competitors out of the market, making that market less competitive, or meaningfully 
raise barriers to entering the searched market.  The answer to this question is no. 
Though Google and other popular search engines have the potential to harm an 
individual website or Internet-based business, and may even force them out of 
business, this does not mean that they have the potential to make the market itself 
less competitive.  By manipulating the position of third parties within search results, 
some sites will end up winners and others losers, but this cannot make the market 
overall less competitive—it simply tinkers with who the top competitors are.  Under 
any search method, whether completely content neutral or a full payola system, there 
will be winners and losers.  The losers, websites that are more difficult to find via 
search engines, may be more likely to go out of business.  Making one site more 
likely to be in that position rather than another is not inherently anticompetitive.150  
Such a practice is unlikely to harm consumers unless it demotes consumers’ desired 
search results in a way that makes them less accessible and promotes less-desired 
results, but this would ultimately make the search engine less useful to the user.  If 
search engines are tinkering with search results, and even accepting payments for 
secret search promotion, it is possible that they are promoting one search result over 
another for which consumers’ preferences are roughly the same.  This does not make 
the market less competitive, it only creates shifts in who the competitors are—a 
question to which antitrust law is ambivalent.151  If, on the other hand, a search 
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engine has some profit motive to promote less useful results, the search engine itself 
will become less useful.  Because of low switching costs and the ease with which 
consumers may experiment with different search engines, even a dominant search 
engine is not likely to be able to tinker with results in this way for long without 
beginning to lose share to competitors.152   
Search bias is unlikely to reduce the number of competitors in searched markets, 
but the question remains whether it may meaningfully raise the price of entry into 
the searched markets.  For some such markets, search engines may be the primary 
method for connecting with consumers.  If firms must expend resources to get access 
to that platform, these expenditures seem wasteful—a fee that competitors must pay 
just to get access to the Internet.  This neutrality-based argument is anomalous to the 
Internet.  In no other context are resources that firms choose to expend to reach 
customers wasteful.  Print advertising cannot reasonably be seen as a violation of 
newspaper neutrality, though in the past that platform has been as important (or more 
important) to gaining access to customers as the Internet is today.  The question is 
not whether search engine practices erect barriers to entry that are higher than they 
would be given a costless membrane that perfectly connected web surfers with the 
ideal site for their desires, but whether a search engine’s discriminatory placement of 
its own or another’s services raises barriers to entry compared to a world without 
that search engine.  For Google, the answer is unambiguously no.  Compared to any 
current alternative, Google provides a cheap and efficient way for competitors in the 
map, e-mail, or online-shoe-shopping markets to connect with their customers.  Even 
if allegations that its search algorithm violates neutrality principles are true, this does 
not provide evidence of consumer harm or a justification to penalize violations of 
search neutrality.  Given that the first step of Justice O’Connor’s analysis suggests 
that the behavior targeted by search neutrality advocates is benign, there is no need 
to balance anticompetitive harm against pro-competitive benefits, but in individual 
cases this may be important. 
Ultimately, neither neutrality principles nor current antitrust rules provide a 
convincing method for analyzing search neutrality.  Neutrality principles would 
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condemn almost any discrimination engaged in by search engines when 
discrimination is at the heart of what search engines do.  These principles provide no 
justification for focusing on specific types of discrimination that search neutrality 
advocates find most troubling.  Antitrust’s quasi per-se rule for analyzing tying 
arrangements proves little more help.  It too casts a very wide net, potentially 
imposing intense scrutiny on pro-compeitive practices when engaged in by firms 
with market power.  Justice O’Connor’s proposed reform of the quasi-per se rule 
brings restraint to the rule by requiring a demonstration either that the discrimination 
will decrease competition or raise barriers to entry in the market affected by the 
platform’s discrimination.  Application of this rule demonstrates that though it could 
meet the letter of the quasi-per se rule, it would be a mistake to enshrine search 
neutrality rules.  This is especially true in today’s search market which is dominated 
by a single firm, but allows users to easily experiment with multiple search engines 
and easily switch between them.  Regulating Google alone is likely to provide an 
edge to its competitors, but not in any pro-competitive way.  Instead, the most likely 
result of search neutrality is to serve as a dead weight on the search market leader, 
slowing down the growth and usefulness of the overall market. 
C.  API Neutrality 
Search neutrality is one of the most prominent applications of the concept of 
neutrality to Internet platforms, and perhaps the most likely to result in regulation, 
but this potential regulation is largely limited to a single market leader in search, 
Google.  Another larger group of Internet platforms has recently faced the possibility 
of neutrality regulation focused on a different type of activity.  Websites that allow 
programs, applications, users, and other websites access to their Application 
Programming Interfaces (“API”) have recently faced claims that they must keep their 
interfaces open and may not restrict them once they have chosen to open them.  An 
API is basically a method that applications and programs can use to communicate 
with and draw functionality from a given website or service.153  The API for a social 
media site, for example, may be entirely closed or broadly open.  A closed API 
means that a website is fully self-encapsulated—users can only interact with the site 
directly, or through applications that are within the direct control of the site owner.  
Sites with more open API allow users to interact with the website using other sites or 
applications created by third parties.  For example, Facebook users may post 
Foursquare check-ins to their Facebook walls through a number of apps154 that allow 
users to make Foursquare check-ins.  Foursquare itself has a fairly open API, thus 
users may check-in on Foursquare and post that check-in to Facebook all while using 
a single app designed by a third party.155  Both Foursquare and the app may be using 
the Facebook API. 
                                                          
 
153
 See generally Application programming interface, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Api (last visited Nov. 15, 2011). 
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 Both proprietary Foursquare apps and third-party apps are available.  These apps use 
API from both Foursquare and Facebook. 
 
155
 See, e.g., Noah Sloan, AppBrain, Check-in Droid 2, 
http://www.appbrain.com/app/check-in-droid-2/com.noahsloan.checkin.android (last visited 
Nov. 15, 2011). 
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Open APIs often lead to a proliferation of ways to interact with a particular 
platform.  For example, those using the Android operating system on a mobile 
device can download several independently designed apps that allow users to interact 
with the social media service Twitter.  These apps may easily create new tweets or 
aggregate a twitter feed with updates from a Facebook account.156  Similarly, other 
social media websites can take advantage of open application programming 
interfaces to make both services more useful.  Websites and social media services 
have discretion in how open or closed to make their API.  A fully open API will 
allow any programmer to make a website, program, or app that will interact with the 
service.  Most major social media services select some degree of openness, and 
third-party applications have often made them more user friendly and have allowed a 
greater range of uses for the service.157 
Neutrality claims focused on API are relatively recent.  In 2008, Professor 
Jonathan Zittrain coined the term “API neutrality” as “a parallel debate that is not 
taking place at all.”158  Since then, the API neutrality claims that have appeared look 
somewhat similar to the neutrality claim considered a decade ago in the Microsoft 
case.  That case was largely about the degree to which the Microsoft Windows 
operating system had to be open to outside developers, particular developers of web 
browsers that competed with Microsoft’s Internet Explorer.159  In the API context, 
there have been claims that the platforms on which programmers have built, 
sometimes in competition with the platform owners themselves, must be kept open.  
Instead of Windows as the platform at issue, it is platforms accessed via the Internet. 
Professor Zittrain sees platform openness as a sort of legal one-way ratchet.  
Once a platform has benefitted from the benefits of an open platform, it can not then 
close its platform—closed systems may remain closed, but once opened, they may 
not close.160  
So when should we consider network neutrality-style mandates for 
appliancized systems?  The answer lies in that subset of appliancized 
systems that seeks to gain the benefits of third-party contribution while 
reserving the right to exclude it later.  Those in favor of network 
neutrality suggest, often implicitly, how foundational the Internet is for 
the services offered over it.  If downstream services cannot rely on the 
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 See, e.g. TWEETDECK, www.tweetdeck.com (last visited Nov. 15, 2011).   
 
157
 The board gaming website www.boardgamegeek.com’s interface with Twitter is an 
example that has allowed a specialty use of Twitter.  There, users can record their 
boardgaming activity and share that activity through Twitter, without leaving 
boardgamegeek.com.  See Boardgame Geek, www.boardgamegeek.com (last visited Jan. 19, 
2012).  This niche functionality is likely not valuable enough to Twitter that the platform 
would have created it on its own, but it does provide some use to the boardgamegeek 
community and may lead to wider use of both sites. 
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 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 181 (2008). 
 
159
 See generally, Op-Ed., Did the Microsoft Case Change the World,  N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 
2011. 
 
160
 Farrell and Weiser identify a one-way legal regime as a reason that a platform might 
remain closed to outside developers when it would be more efficient to remain open—simply 
because it is harder to close than it is to open.  See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 8, at 117. 
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networks they use to provide roughly equal treatment of their bits, the 
playing field for Internet activities can shift drastically.161   
This argument that platform-benefitting innovation will not occur without some 
guarantee that the platform will remain open to innovators would be unique as the 
basis for market regulation.  Seldom do businesses receive governmental guarantees 
that the conditions under which they enter a market will remain.  Instead, they must 
negotiate such stability with their business partners, or earn longevity by providing a 
service or product better than others can.162  Nor would such a mandate be obviously 
a positive development.  As established in Part II, it may be optimal for a platform 
like Twitter to be either open or closed, and platforms usually have incentives to 
follow the optimal path.163 
Others have made more directed claims, arguing that a specific API must be 
forced or kept open for developers.  For example, some have argued that online 
platforms, often social media sites, have become so important to daily interaction 
that they are like utilities and thus must be regulated to ensure their neutral 
availability.164  This perspective may have gained influence within a regulatory 
agency.  The FTC has recently engaged in an investigation focused on Twitter’s API 
policy, following a recent restriction in that policy.  Twitter has sought to exert 
greater control over its platform.165  It has simultaneously began to increase the 
amount of advertising on its site and proprietary apps, providing a rationale for the 
site to want to direct users to its site and apps rather than letting them access the 
service and network from third party apps.166  These efforts have resulted in a clash 
with at least one firm that designs third party apps for viewing and creating tweets.  
UberMedia is the owner of Twidroyd, a leading Twitter app for Android devices.167  
In February, 2011, according to the Wall Street Journal, “UberMedia . . . said 
Twitter shut off its access to tweets because it believed UberMedia had violated 
‘several provisions of their terms of service.’”168  Some have suggested that 
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 ZITTRAIN, supra note 158, at 183. 
 
162
 See GRIMMELMAN, supra note 129, at 448 (“A right to continued customer traffic would 
be a legal anomaly; offline businesses enjoy no such right.  Some Manhattanites who take the 
free IKEA ferry to its store in Brooklyn eat at the nearby food trucks in the Red Hook Ball 
Fields.  The food truck owners would have no right to complain if IKEA discontinued the 
ferry or moved its store.”) (footnote omitted). 
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 See supra, text accompanying notes 16-17 (describing Farrell & Weiser’s ICE concept).   
 
164
 See, e.g., Danah Boyd, Facebook Is a Utility; Utilities Get Regulated, APOPHENIA (Mar. 
15, 2010), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/05/15/facebook-is-a-utility-
utilities-get-regulated.html: 
  If Facebook is a utility – and I strongly believe it is – the handful of people who are 
building cabins in the woods to get away from the evil utility companies are irrelevant 
in light of all of the people who will suck up and deal with the utility to live in the 
city. This is going to come down to regulation, whether we like it or not. 
 
165
 See Amir Efrati, Antitrust Regulator Makes Twitter Inquiries, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2011. 
 
166
 Id. 
 
167
 Id. 
 
168
 Id. 
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UberMedia is the target of Twitter’s API constriction because Twitter views it as a 
potential competitor.169  During this same time period, Twitter acquired another very 
popular app for using Twitter and other social media sites in a mobile environment, 
Tweetdeck.  Both Twitter and UberMedia sought to purchase Tweetdeck, a contest 
that Twitter ultimately won.170  UberMedia recently acknowledged that it had 
received requests for information from the FTC as a part of an inquiry related to its 
relationship with Twitter.171  As with the Google inquiry, it is not yet clear that 
anything will come of the FTC’s seemingly more narrow Twitter inquiry, but it 
raises the possibility of a widespread, coordinated, neutrality-motivated examination 
of Internet platforms.   
Others believe that regulatory action is not necessary.  Mathew Ingram argues 
that while Twitter may provide a service that is unique and valuable enough to 
survive without third party developers, cutting them off will provide a boost to 
Twitter’s nascent competitors.172  Thus there may be no anticompetitive effect for 
regulation to address—instead, by restricting its API, Twitter could create an 
opportunity for more competition in the submarket that it currently dominates.  
Adam Thierer identifies a different danger in premature regulation.  His argument 
focuses on innovation: “If we apply API neutrality or adverse possession principles 
forcibly, it sends a horrible signal to entrepreneurs that basically says their platforms 
are theirs in name only and will be forcibly commoditized once they are popular 
enough.  That’s a horrible disincentive to future innovation and investment.”173  His 
disagreement with Zittrain and other API neutrality advocates comes down to a 
differing focus on the locus of innovation.  Thierer would preserve the incentive to 
come up with innovative new platforms by allowing platform owners traditional 
property rights in the platform.  Zittrain on the other hand focuses on innovation on 
the edge of the platform.  Thierer counters that this focus puts the very platform in 
jeopardy, and most platforms are remarkably open anyways.174  This debate parallels 
the debate between Professors Wu and Yoo in which Yoo argues that competition 
should be fostered and protected where it is least present, not where it is already 
robust. 
Despite these critics’ objections, the recent FTC investigation into Twitter raises 
the strong possibility of a wider focus on applying the concept of neutrality to 
                                                          
 
169
 See id.  This theory fits neatly with one of the exceptions to Farrell & Weiser’s ICE.  A 
platform may not select the optimal level of openness if it fears that the application will 
become a platform competitor.  See Farrell & Weiser, supra note 16, at 109-10.  However, 
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market, but simply for the advertising revenue that is available for services that connect users 
to the service. 
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 See id.; Joe Mullin, Disharmony in Twitter-Land? FTC Has Questions for Company’s 
Developers, PAIDCONTENT (July 1, 2011, 2:34 PM), http://paidcontent.org/article/419-
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 Adam Thierer, A Vision of (Regulatory) Things to Come for Twitter?, TECHNOLOGY 
LIBERATION FRONT (Mar. 13, 2011), http://techliberation.com/2011/03/13/a-vision-of-
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Internet platforms.  Such a movement, spread across many Internet-based markets 
and services, could promote or stunt the growth and usefulness of the Internet for 
years to come.  It is important that any such widespread scrutiny proceed under a 
rational framework, one that identifies non-neutral behaviors that are actually 
harmful and allows those that are innovative or pro-competitive to proceed.  
Unfortunately, in API neutrality, as in search neutrality discussed above, neither of 
the two likely candidates for analyzing neutrality violations does a good job of 
identifying harmful methods of competition. 
1.  Neutrality Principles Applied to API 
Principles drawn from the network neutrality context, especially the FCC’s 
Network Neutrality order, are unlikely to be helpful in analyzing API neutrality 
claims.  They provide little guidance in distinguishing between API that is 
sufficiently open or excessively closed.  Transparency is not the major problem that 
proponents of API neutrality seek to address.  Transparency issues may arise, but 
they tend to be short lived.  For example, when Twitter blocked apps by the 
developer UberMedia, the developer quickly brought its apps into line with Twitter’s 
existing policies, and acknowledged that the company had already been in 
negotiations with Twitter to ensure continued access to Twitter’s API and to bring 
UberMedia apps within Twitter’s API policy.175  Most major platforms offering 
outside developers API access have published policies on what developers may 
do.176  When there are conflicts or misunderstandings over these policies, the conflict 
is transparent—the developer knows that their product has been blocked.  Not only 
do conflicts quickly become transparent, but they are robustly discussed in the 
blogosphere making competition between platform owners for developers possible. 
The no blocking and no unreasonable discrimination principles would also be 
difficult to apply to API.  No blocking would require a sea change, either forcing all 
Internet-based platforms to close to third party developers, or forcing platforms to 
choose between an entirely-open or entirely-closed model.  As Farrell and Weiser’s 
ICE demonstrates, forcing all platforms open to third party developers would not be 
wise.  In some instances, the most efficient and productive path is for the platform 
owner to control all platform applications, for example, when third-party developers 
might offer a lower quality product that would harm the reputation of the platform, 
or when security of the platform is more important to users than a diversity of 
applications.177 
In order to apply the non-discrimination rules in any rational way, it would be 
necessary to identify some method to distinguish between reasonable and 
unreasonable discrimination.  There will always be some potential third-party 
application that will be foreclosed by any specific API policy—the challenge is to 
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 See Ingram, supra note 112. 
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 See, e.g., Twitter, Developer Rules of the Road, TWITTER DEVELOPERS (June 1, 
2011),http://dev.twitter.com/pages/api_terms; Facebook, Facebook Platform Policies, 
FACEBOOK DEVELOPERS (Oct. 10, 2011), http://developers.facebook.com/policy/. 
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 Zittrain has drawn one possible line between platforms that may be closed and those 
that must be open.  Platforms may choose to be closed, but once they open and take advantage 
of third party developers’ efforts, they may not re-close.  See supra, text accompanying notes 
160-163. 
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identify acceptable and unacceptable foreclosure.  Neutrality principles provide little 
guidance in that endeavor.   
It might be possible to apply a non-discrimination policy, allowing platforms to 
select their own preferred degree of openness to third-party developers, but requiring 
that policy to be applied neutrally.  Such a policy could be in line with the FCC rules 
by allowing discrimination between types of uses, but not between individual 
users.178  This, for example, would allow Twitter to decide to allow or not allow 
third parties to design mobile apps to create tweets, but it would not permit it to 
allow some app developers to proceed while blocking apps created by a potential 
competitor like UberMedia.179   
Most calls for API neutrality, however, do not focus on neutrality between 
developers, but between developers and the platform’s own products.  Such 
discrimination against competing applications would clearly violate the Network 
Neutrality Report and Order if applied to Internet platforms.  For example, much of 
the consternation over Twitter’s constriction of API openness was based on the fact 
that some of the apps cut off were competitors with Twitter’s own products.  The 
problem for developers was not that Twitter chose to discriminate between them, 
giving preference to some over others, but that it chose to restrict its API for all 
developers in order to promote its own proprietary products.  But Farrell and 
Weiser’s ICE principle cautions against forcing a platform to allow third-party 
developers to compete with its own products—which is to force platform openness.  
In some situations an open platform will allow innovation and competition in the 
applications market, but in others, applications may simply free-ride on an 
innovative platform without providing additional value to users.  According to 
Farrell and Weiser, platforms will generally open and close when it is efficient for 
them to do so.180  The type of balancing analysis that this distinction requires is not 
promoted by neutrality principles but is typical of antitrust principles, even if the 
current quasi-per se rule itself is not particularly suitable to the task. 
2.  Antitrust Analysis of API Neutrality Claims 
Tying doctrine has somewhat more to offer a neutrality-motivated analysis of 
API.  The platform and tying good is the website or service to which third-party 
programmers would like to connect—and may have an open or closed API.  The tied 
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 If the FCC’s Report and Order were applied to Internet platforms, even this policy 
might run afoul of the non-discrimination principle if the fixed rather than wireless broadband 
rules were applied. 
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 The concept of API seems to imply some level of neutrality or openness.  If a platform 
decides to allow just a single third-party to develop and publish an app to interact with the 
platform, that’s not really an API, it’s an outsourcing contract. 
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 In the Twitter example, one of the apps that was cut off was “Twidroyd,” an app for 
Android devices that competed with Twitter’s own Android app.  Ingram, supra note 112.  If 
cutting that app off from the Twitter API were to decrease Twitter usage or make Twitter less 
valuable to its users, the platform would likely allow it continued access.  API neutrality 
advocates argue that access is necessary for continued platform innovation, but such 
innovation is in the platform’s interest as well.  There may be situations where the platform 
will not follow the path that will lead to greatest platform consumption.  See text 
accompanying note 17, supra, discussing the exceptions to ICE, but the non-discrimination 
principle is ill-suited to identify such situations. 
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good is either the proprietary services that are the only choice if a platform has 
chosen a closed API, or the favored applications if the platform selects an API policy 
that is in some way discriminatory.  To the extent that the platform restricts the 
developers who may use the API or the uses to which third-party applications may 
be put, it ties use of the underlying platform to a specific set of applications which 
may be built upon that platform.  The Twitter example is illustrative.  By restricting 
the ways that apps may use its API, Twitter tied use of its micro-blogging service to 
use of a specific set of favored apps, including (but not exclusively) its own apps. 
The two-product requirement cannot be applied generally to API-neutrality 
claims; in some cases the platform and the applications that connect to it will be a 
single product, and in others they will be two products.  If the platform never opens 
its API to outside programmers and all related services are provided by the platform 
owner, no demand for third-party services may develop, and the platform and its 
applications will remain a single product.  However, many platforms follow a pattern 
of opening their API initially, then closing it later.  In this way, when a platform is 
attempting to gain a foothold in the market, it may use third-party developers to 
rapidly expand the services available on the platform and improve its usability.181  
Later, once the platform has gained a foothold in the market, it may be tempted to 
restrict the use of its API in order to promote its own services and to gain more 
control over its successful platform.182  Once a platform’s API has been opened to 
some third-party development, if developers take advantage of that access, it is likely 
that the market for applications that work with the platform is separate from the 
market in which the platform itself competes.  Applications built on platforms in this 
way may compete with each other (for example competition between apps to view 
tweets) or with applications on other platforms (for example, interactive online 
games that use Facebook’s API to connect players may compete with games on other 
forums).  Either way, if there is any meaningful response to the platform opening its 
API, that will be sufficient to meet the two-product requirement. 
For the market power test, some platforms will have power while others will not.  
The basic question is whether the platform can impose a tie or other onerous terms 
without losing market share.  In the example of Twitter, this seems doubtful.  While 
it is dominant among its direct competitors in micro-blogging, these are not its true 
competition.  Twitter competes more generally with a huge range of other services: 
social networking sites; blogs; blog aggregators; news websites; and more.  As 
Adam Thierer notes, “[f]or me, Twitter is a partial substitute for blogging, IMs, 
email, phone calls, and my RSS feed.  Yes, like most others, I continue to use all 
those other technologies and those technologies continue to pressure Twitter to 
innovate.”183  Given a demand that reaches across several partially interchangeable 
services and platforms, it appears unlikely that Twitter has the sort of economic 
power that would allow it to impose an inefficient tying arrangement.  But it is 
possible that if the market is narrowly defined as micro-blogging, it might.  In other 
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situations, it will be clear that the platform does not have market power; in such 
situations the analysis may end here. 
Under the quasi-per se rule, demonstrating two products, market power, and a 
substantial volume of commerce would be sufficient to invoke per se condemnation.  
But given that the only platform to face an API-neutrality related investigation is 
unlikely to have that power, it is worthwhile to examine the likely effects of an API-
neutrality violation in greater depth.  The relevant questions are whether the 
platform’s use of its market power will either make the application market 
meaningfully less competitive or raise barriers to entering that market.  For both 
questions, the likely answer is that it will not.  First, if the platform has market 
power but the applications market cuts across several platforms, then the tying 
arrangement is unlikely to force any competitors out, making the applications market 
less competitive.184  Two examples are illustrative.  First, several firms design apps 
that allow users to participate in several social networks from the same interface.  
These apps are widely used and make it especially easy for social media users to 
engage with the service via their mobile devices. If one social media site, Twitter, for 
example, closed its API to some or all of these social media coordination apps, it 
would risk losing users who value the coordinating app more than the single service 
that Twitter offers.  Others of course will switch to another third-party app, or will 
use Twitter’s own app in addition to the app that was cut off.  Twitter may have an 
incentive to try to force all users to use its own app, but doing so may risk incurring 
the same behavior from other social networks.  If Facebook, Foursquare, Google+, 
and other social networks all limit their interface to their own apps, then the 
aggregating market will disappear, users will have to use many apps, and each 
network will be used by a smaller proportion of all social media users.  A similar 
dynamic is at work for online games.  Games are available everywhere—on social 
media sites like Facebook, on specialty sites like boardgamegeek.com, on mobile 
device apps, and in any number of other places.  Game developers and popular 
games cut across all of these platforms.  A site that benefits from this market (as 
Facebook does) has very little incentive to block a group of them from its API.  Even 
if it were to decide to do so, it would have very little impact on the competitive 
conditions in the overall gaming market.  In short, even if Facebook does have 
market power in the social media market, it does not necessarily have that power in 
the applications market which may be broader than the platform market.  Of course, 
in some cases, an applications market will develop that is absolutely platform-
specific.  This is rare.  In the recent controversial example of Twitter narrowing 
access to its API, the apps that were cut off were for the most part not Twitter-
specific.  Though there are apps and other uses of API that are specific to the 
platform, these are unlikely to be the source of API-neutrality claims.185 
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This analysis demonstrates not only that the FTC’s Twitter inquiry should likely 
not result in any API-neutrality enforcement, but also that the two likely candidates 
for methods of neutrality analysis are inadequate.  Network neutrality principles 
provide little guidance for examining API neutrality claims, and antitrust’s quasi-per 
se rule would condemn actions that are unlikely to have any negative effects. 
D.  Online Marketplace Neutrality 
Another area on which neutrality claims have recently focused is on specialized 
online markets.  Platform-specific marketplaces often interact with content providers 
and customers in non-neutral ways.  For example, Apple recently announced a 
digital media subscription service available through its App Store.  Through this 
service, iPhone and iPad users can easily purchase subscriptions to newspapers, 
magazines, and other media like music and video subscriptions.186  Within one day, 
Google had announced a similar service, the One Pass.187  Though Apple’s new 
service holds the potential to connect customers to content in a new, convenient, and 
likely profitable way, some have balked at the terms that publishers must accept to 
gain access to the platform.  When Apple announced the subscription service, it 
required publishers to pay a 30% fee to Apple; it required publishers of iOS Apps to 
abstain from selling subscriptions directly through their apps without going through 
the App Store (and paying Apple’s 30% fee); it required any digital content available 
to purchase in an app to also be available for sale in iTunes; and it required any 
publisher selling subscriptions through the App Store to sell those subscriptions at a 
price as low or lower than digital subscriptions available anywhere else.188  These 
terms funnel publishers and users into a walled garden with high fees, and away 
from the previous system in which publishers had the ability to freely sell 
subscriptions through their own less-controlled apps or uncontrolled websites.   
Not surprisingly, publishers and neutrality advocates immediately criticized the 
new terms.  In particular, publishers of music streaming services claimed that their 
business model was unsustainable under Apple’s rules.189  A number of magazine 
                                                          
owner believes that more user satisfaction can be obtained through a closed system than 
through an open one.  See supra text accompanying notes 15-17.  Though neither situation 
raises significant concerns here, barring new entrants from an applications market is generally 
not as concerning to neutrality advocates as forcing existing competitors out.  
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and newspaper publishers also criticized the new terms.190  These content providers 
criticized the high fees they were now required to pay to sell subscriptions on iOS 
and the policies that made it difficult to circumvent those fees.  But the harshest 
iteration of Apple’s new policy was short-lived.  It was countered immediately by a 
mixture of technological innovation, competitive pressure, and the threat of 
administrative action.   
The Financial Times reacted to the subscription service’s terms by shifting 
emphasis from its iOS app to a state-of-the-art web app that provides similar 
functionality to its iOS app without requiring download of an approved app through 
the App Store.191  In this way it was able to circumvent some of the new rules, 
because it no longer was bound to Apple’s rules for downloadable apps.192  Apple 
also immediately faced competitive pressure—the day after it announced the 
subscription service, Google announced its own similar service, charging only a 10% 
fee.193  Though no formal investigation was announced, Apple did face an informal 
threat of antitrust enforcement by either the Department of Justice or the Federal 
Trade Commission.194  Online marketplaces thus enter the list of Internet-based 
platforms and services to face legitimate threats of enforcement action stemming 
from neutrality concerns.  As with search neutrality and API neutrality, an 
examination of both antitrust and neutrality principles identifies no convincing 
rationale for restricting these arrangements.   
In the face of competition, innovation, criticism, and potential legal action, Apple 
quickly backed down on some of its subscription service terms.  Four months after 
announcing its service, Apple announced that it would allow publishers to offer iOS 
subscriptions at higher prices than offered elsewhere in order to cover the App 
Store’s 30% fee.195  Apple also decided to allow publishers to offer read-only apps, 
providing free or pre-paid content not available in the App Store.196  Apple’s 
                                                          
streaming model is untenable, Apple faces the choice of allowing third parties to continue 
streaming, to provide competing content, or risk losing customers who want to stream music. 
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revision of its policy suggests that the company does not have unlimited power to 
force unattractive terms on the application creators that provide much of the content 
that makes the iOS platform attractive.   
Though Apple’s iTunes terms are the most notable current example of an online 
marketplace facing neutrality-based claims, there are other marketplaces that may 
lead to similar claims.  For example, for e-book publishing, there are several major 
online stores that offer both e-readers and e-books.  Amazon has a relatively closed 
platform—the e-books it sells can only be read on its own Kindle devices or apps, 
and those devices and apps can only support the e-book format provided by 
Amazon.197  Barnes and Noble, on the other hand, sells e-readers that can support e-
books from Barnes and Noble some other sources of e-books.198  These differing 
policies could cause neutrality advocates to attempt to challenge a platform under 
neutrality principles or antitrust laws.199 
1.  Neutrality-Based Analysis of Discriminating Online Market Platforms 
Apple’s subscription service and its Google competitor One Pass do not have 
obvious transparency problems.  The terms of each are clearly laid out and they 
compete on those terms.200  Following network neutrality principles, a lack of 
transparency between competing marketplaces would be a problem if users did not 
know before adopting the iOS platform that digital content providers face harsh 
terms in making digital content available to iOS users.  In this case, however, the 
terms are public, and in line with Apple’s general philosophy and business strategy 
of maintaining a more controlled mobile environment. 
This leads directly to the other two of the FCC’s network neutrality principles—
no blocking and no unreasonable discrimination.  The App Store’s subscription 
service appears to run afoul of these principles which focus specially on not blocking 
or discriminating against competing services.  Here, the App Store wholly blocks 
other iOS marketplaces that might sell digital subscriptions, including publishers’ 
own apps, and requires publishers to use iTunes to sell digital subscriptions or not do 
so through apps at all.201  In the basic network neutrality context, this would be 
nearly unthinkable (but not necessariliy harmful).  If an Internet service provider 
were to only give customers access to the websites that paid it for access to the 
platform, the FCC would likely take immediate action for violating the no-blocking 
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rule.202  Here, it is apps that function in certain ways that are blocked.  In fact, a 
network neutrality complaint was filed against a small wireless network that sought 
to bundle a special YouTube service with one of its mobile phone plans, without 
offering this special connection to every other website on the Internet.203  This 
offering was politically impossible for the regional budget network that tried to make 
it.   
But it is not so clear that similar actions are a problem when engaged in by 
higher-level Internet platforms.  For online markets like the App Store and One Pass, 
the very enterprise would be impossible without the ability to support publishers 
who are willing to pay the commission and block those that are not.  Apple and 
Google can only offer their respective subscription services because of their ability 
to sell the service to publishers.  Digital marketplaces would not be a plausible 
business model if they could not charge fees and impose terms that allow them to 
monetize the service they provide in easily connecting users and content.204  There is 
a clear reason why network neutrality principles misfire when applied to online 
marketplaces.  Network neutrality developed in the context of low levels of 
competition and high switching costs.  For online marketplaces that face 
marketplace-neutrality claims, especially marketplaces for digital subscription 
services, users can choose between platforms that have meaningfully different 
policies regarding where and how users may get digital subscriptions.  Even once a 
user is locked in to the more restrictive iOS ecosystem, they may buy digital 
subscriptions through the convenient App Store, or by, somewhat less conveniently, 
going through the publisher’s website or some other marketplace not housed in an 
iOS app.  Users are only restricted from both having the most convenient option and 
not paying the fee that Apple is able to command.  It seems likely that the App 
Store’s seemingly draconian terms allow it to offer publishers and users features, an 
ease of use, and convenience that would not otherwise be possible.  From this 
perspective, Apple’s terms begin to look like the process of competition, rather than 
a sabotage of that process.  Though network neutrality principles provide a method 
for identifying marketplace neutrality claims to scrutinize, online marketplaces are 
different enough from broadband providers that it would unwise to transpose 
network neutrality principles onto online marketplaces. 
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2.  Antitrust Scrutiny of Online Markets’ Discriminatory Terms 
Online markets that restrict sellers’ abilities to sell elsewhere or put other 
burdensome terms on marketplace participation are not the prototypical example of a 
tying arrangement.  But they can still be usefully framed and analyzed under the 
quasi-per se rule.  Normally, markets like iTunes compete for customers by offering 
convenience, low prices, or valuable services.  The App Store clearly does offer 
some of these, but it also may gain customers through a tying arrangement in which 
it (along with its terms and fees) is the tied good.  It might seem that the tying good 
is the apps and digital subscriptions that must be purchased through iTunes—but in 
fact the tying good is the iOS operating system and the devices on which it must 
operate.  By selecting a mobile device that runs on iOS, the user accepts the tie with 
the iTunes App Store, and restrictions on the apps available for iOS.  It is because 
this tying arrangement is in place that iPhone and iPad users who want to get a 
digital subscription are limited to the content providers that work within Apple’s 
terms in order to be available on the platform.  iTunes is the exclusive marketplace 
for the iOS, excluding competing marketplaces like the Amazon App Store that is 
offered on the Android OS.  Framed in this way, the tying analysis proposed above 
is easily applied. 
First, the two-product requirement likely is met.  There are two products with 
demand to purchase each separately from the other.  The tying goods, the iOS and 
the few devices on which it operates, compete in one market against Android, 
Blackberry, Microsoft and other Smartphone and mobile devices.  Online 
marketplaces for digital subscriptions operate in another market, and they compete to 
sell digital subscriptions separate from competition between mobile operating 
systems and devices.  Even under Apple’s restrictive terms, within the iOS 
ecosystem the App Store competes with other places where consumers can purchase 
digital subscriptions.  For example, users can buy digital subscriptions directly from 
publishers on their websites, from other marketplaces, like Amazon.com (though 
they may not do so through an iOS app), and, until Apple’s recent policy change, 
from apps that operate on iOS.  Outside of iOS, consumers purchase digital 
subscriptions through several online marketplaces that compete with the App Store 
to sell digital subscriptions, including the Android Market, Amazon’s App Store, and 
the Kindle App (both for iOS and Android).  Clearly, mobile operating systems and 
devices operate in a different competitive market than online Marketplaces that sell 
digital subscriptions.  
In Jefferson Parish, the Court found that anesthesiological services that were tied 
to use of hospital surgical services were a separate product because consumers 
regularly sought to select surgical services separately from anesthesiological 
services—the fact that one hospital sought to offer the two together did not change 
the fact that generally there is demand to purchase them separately.205  A similar 
analysis applies in the iTunes context.  There is demand to select digital 
marketplaces separately from operating systems—the fact that Apple sanctions only 
a single App Store for iOS does not change this more general market fact.  Having 
determined that two products are indeed tied, a platform (iOS and iOS devices) to a 
specific application (the App Store), the subsequent steps determine whether the 
neutrality violations implicated by the tie warrant scrutiny. 
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The second prong of the test looks at whether the platform owner has market 
power in the platform market—does Apple have market power in the operating 
system or mobile device market?  The answer appears to be no.  Though Apple and 
its iOS does occupy a large portion of the market for mobile operating systems, it 
does not have such a dominant position or unique product that it can impose onerous 
terms without losing part of that market share.206  Any decrease in usefulness in the 
operating system caused by requiring users to purchase some products through 
iTunes is a potential decrease in the number of users who decide on iOS rather than 
Android, Blackberry, or Microsoft’s mobile OS.  There is evidence for this fact in 
the context in which Apple’s subscription service was released.  The next day 
Google announced a similar competing service that had more favorable terms in 
place of some of the onerous ones imposed by Apple.  If either Google or Apple had 
the economic power to impose onerous terms without losing customers, we would 
not see this competition on marketplace terms.  Nor does iOS occupy a sufficient 
portion of the market to suggest such power.  Android devices outsell iPhones.207  In 
this case, it appears that competitive harm is unlikely and the quasi-per se rule 
provides no justification for further scrutiny.208 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Scrutiny of non-neutral behavior by Internet platforms appears to be inevitable.  
The FTC has launched or threatened to launch investigations into a number of 
Internet platforms, and commentators have called repeatedly for scrutiny of search 
neutrality, API neutrality, and online marketplace neutrality violations.  This attack 
on the business practices of firms that give content and structure to the Internet lacks 
a coherent framework for separating harmful violations of neutrality principles from 
business arrangements that are forms of competition.  Section V demonstrates that 
application of either of the likely methods for scrutiny of Internet platforms, a 
network neutrality or antitrust framework, will result in penalization of the process 
of competition on the Internet, without identifying neutrality violations that are 
likely to harm to competition or innovation on the Internet.  Instead of either of these 
shortsighted methods, policymakers, and the FTC in particular, should shift their 
focus from neutrality concerns to the prevention of identifiable economic harms that 
may be the result of non-neutral platform behavior.  The concept of neutrality may 
still be a valuable flag, suggesting that it is necessary to look for harmful business 
practices, but a violation of neutrality principles alone does not demonstrate a 
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competitive problem.  Part V demonstrates this fact by examining three platforms 
that face neutrality-based challenges.  Yet none of these three can be adequately 
scrutinized by either neutrality or antitrust frameworks. 
In evaluating neutrality concerns as applied to Internet platforms, it is important 
not to lose sight of the unique characteristics of Internet platforms that make simple 
application of existing rules inadequate.  Internet platforms in general tend to share 
several qualities, and it is these qualities that prove problematic for application of the 
quasi-per se rule and neutrality principles.  These qualities are covered in detail in 
Part V.a, but to recap, Internet platforms are different from either the goods that 
generally are included in tying arrangements or the Internet access points to which 
network neutrality principles are applied.  For Internet platforms, use of one platform 
generally does not preclude use of another.  Even when only one platform can be 
used at a time, switching costs tend to be low.  Further, non-neutral behavior, 
especially discrimination between potential platform applications may be necessary 
to an Internet platform’s business model. 
In looking for economic harms related to violations of neutrality principles, 
policymakers should specifically look for evidence of foreclosure and exclusion.  
Foreclosure, when a firm is forced out of a market, and exclusion when barriers to 
entry raise the costs of entering a market, are the specific types of competitive harm 
that violations of neutrality principles may cause in some situations.  These were 
found to be potential, but not actual harms for each of the platforms examined above. 
Search neutrality is an important principle, not because search engines should not 
discriminate between potential search results.  To the contrary, they must do so.  
This discrimination is the basis on which they compete.  Violations of search 
neutrality become a problem when search engines discriminate between potential 
search results in ways that make it difficult to enter the searched markets, or force 
some firms out of the searched markets in ways that make these markets overall less 
competitive.  This exclusion and foreclosure is, of course, only possible if the 
discriminatory search engine has market power.  Even discrimination may not cause 
the searched market to be less competitive, and evidence of such an effect should be 
required before penalizing a search engine. 
Similarly, for API and online-marketplace neutrality, the harm does not stem 
from the discrimination itself, which may be a pro-competitive method of 
competition between platforms, but from discrimination which makes a second 
market less competitive due to exclusion or foreclosure.  For API neutrality, this 
could happen if one platform, a social media site, for example, was both dominant, 
and a necessary access point to succeed in a second market, for example, a video 
game market.  For online markets like iTunes and Google’s One Pass, the 
marketplaces have not been shown to have the power to require terms that would 
exclude competitors from the digital content markets.  For the most part, this is 
because iTunes is a convenient way for publishers to pay to get access to customers 
on iOS devices, but not a necessary one for a publisher to compete in the digital 
publishing market. 
This focus on exclusion and foreclosure may sound overly broad.  Luckily, this 
analysis need not be wide open, and may be structured by our understanding of 
platform behavior.  Justice O’Connor laid the groundwork for this analysis in her 
attempt to reform tying doctrine.  The ultimate harms that non-neutral platform 
behavior may cause are exclusion and foreclosure, but courts and policymakers may 
take threshold questions from the quasi-per se rule, and apply them with an eye 
towards ultimate economic harms, as Justice O’Connor proposes.   
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Scrutiny of platform behavior that is discriminatory towards platform 
applications or users is only warranted when 1) the platform and the applications or 
products making use of the platform occupy separate markets with separate 
consumer demands;209 2) the platform has economic power; and 3) the platform 
exclusivity or non-neutrality is likely either to force existing competitors of the 
applications market out of the market, or raise the barriers to entering applications 
markets generally.210  As in Justice O’Connor’s gloss on the quasi-per se rule, these 
anticompetitive effects must then be balanced against any pro-competitive effects 
that the arrangement may have. 
For each of the Internet platforms considered above, this framework produces 
more reasonable results, allowing pro-competitive business arrangements to be 
separated from those that may harm competition in Internet markets.  It becomes 
clear that discrimination between search results is a form of competition that is only 
problematic if a search engine can make search results less useful and more 
profitable without losing users.  Similarly, restricting API is only a problem if a 
platform with market power can make an entire secondary, tied market less 
competitive.  In today’s world of vigorous competition between websites and 
Internet services, this is unlikely.  And for online marketplaces, limiting access to the 
market platform can only harm consumers if the market itself is so powerful that no 
successful application can go without it and must abide by whatever terms it 
imposes.  Additionally, the marketplace must be able to survive the absence of 
applications that are forced both off the platform and out of the market by onerous 
terms. 
This Article has examined three Internet platforms that have faced claims that 
they must be in some way more neutral.  It has demonstrated that neither of the 
likely ways in which agencies and courts might scrutinize this discriminatory 
behavior are adequate to distinguish between competitive behavior between market 
participants and anticompetitive arrangements that harm online markets.  Finally, it 
has proposed a method of analysis in which neutrality-based claims should be 
examined for the presence of two markets in which the platform has market power in 
one market and uses that power to either exclude or foreclose platform applications 
from a second market.  This Article has applied this method of analysis to three 
Internet platforms, but there are many others that either are now, or could in the 
future face claims that they violate some neutrality principle.  For example, e-book 
publishers, sellers, and devices all have the potential to behave in discriminatory 
ways towards each other.  The manner in which search engines interact with social 
media sites could also be the subject of neutrality scrutiny.  Recently, Facebook has 
made data from its social network available to power the results of a single search 
engine, Bing, but has refused to grant the same access to Google or other search 
competitors.211  This Article proposes a method that is sufficiently general to be 
applied to such neutrality claims, as well as others that have not yet occurred. 
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